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ABSTRACT
Using cross-national panel data, I investigated relationships among sociopolitical instability, major
intrastate conflicts, democracy levels, and media and new information and communication technologies (ICTs)
penetration rates and press freedoms. I conducted similar analyses regarding all non-democracies, looking at various
types of political instability and media/ICT penetration rates. The results of this research add to democratic, freedom
of expression, and political communication theories. These findings bring empirical evidence to help illuminate
many of the popular debates surrounding the impact of new ICTs and freedom of expression on popular dissident
activities.
My results suggested that countries with higher rates of Internet and cell-phone penetration are more likely
to experience sociopolitical instability, are more likely to experience nonviolent conflict compared to violent
conflict, and to have higher levels of institutionalized democracy. I also found that higher levels of press freedoms
were strong predictors of sociopolitical stability, nonviolent conflict over violent conflict, and increased levels of
institutionalized democracy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years, conflicts have erupted in nearly every part of the world. Some of these conflicts turned
violent such as the civil war in Syria, and some of these conflicts were popular nonviolent (predominately) protests
such as the Egyptian uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak (Ortiz, Burke, Berrada & Cortes, 2013). From the
beginning of 2006 to July 2013, protests have occurred in nearly 90 countries (Ortiz et al., 2013). The global
economic collapse spurred an increase in sociopolitical instability worldwide. The protesters targeted institutions
and holders of power and their grievances included issues such as lack of economic justice and political
representation, self-determination campaigns, and global justice (Ortiz et al., 2013).
In many of the dissident campaigns, the challengers used new information and communication technologies
(ICTs), such as cell-phones and the Internet, to organize opposition and target national governments (Howard &
Hussain, 2013). Some people are quick to link the recent spike in protests and democratization movements with the
worldwide diffusion of new ICTs and social media. Some scholars claim that new ICTs empower individuals in
unprecedented ways and could usher in a massive era of democratization (Castells, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013;
Shirky, 2009). Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence, at the aggregate-level, supporting the relationship
between sociopolitical instability, democracy, and new ICTs. My aim here is to explore the macro-level
relationships among sociopolitical instability, major nonviolent/violent conflict, democracy, and new ICTs and press
freedoms using panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) and logistic regression models.
The relationships among democratic progress, sociopolitical (in)stability, media systems development, and
economic growth are interdependent and reinforcing (Weaver, Buddenbaum, & Fair, 1985). In order to remain
economically competitive in the global markets, authoritarian governments likely need to adopt new ICTs.
Consequently, adopting new ICTs for economic purposes increases information outlets and flow, which makes it
harder for governments to control and could spur sociopolitical instability (Kendzie & Aragon, 2002).
The magnitude that social media and new ICTs influence conflicts is an ongoing debate and a popular topic
among scholars, pundits, and experts. Nevertheless, as evident by increasing restrictions and surveillance practices,
those in power certainly view new ICTs and social media as threatening and powerful. Following the Gezi Park
protests in Turkey, the Turkish government outlawed Twitter and YouTube (Rawlinson, 2014). After riding the
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momentum of popular protests, the military-led government in Egypt abruptly increased freedom of speech
restrictions and jailed several media personnel and bloggers (Murphy, 2014).
Many of those conflicts are protracted, and the form that those conflicts took/take (nonviolent protest/
violent armed war) could have major implications for the futures of those countries (Celistino & Gleditsch, 2013;
Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). There is evidence that compared to violent uprisings, nonviolent regime challenging
conflict is quicker and more successful at ousting dictators and foreign occupiers and is more likely to lead to
democratic governance (Celistino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).
Much of the political communication scholarship links the importance of vibrant media systems to
functional democracies (Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013). Traditionally, the fundamental purposes of the media are
to inform and engage the populace as well

as check governmental power (Lippmann, 1922; Siebert, Peterson,

Schramm, 1956, 1984). Democracy relies on a healthy public sphere that encourages free flowing debates of ideas
and opinions (Habermas, 1989). Many studies have indicated that increasing networks of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) may be important to the integrity of the public sphere and democratic growth
(Best & Wade, 2005; Groshek, 2009; Groshek, 2011; Pilat & Wyckoff, 2005; Weaver et al., 1985). The direction of
the relationship between media systems and democratic growth, however, is not well established. The evidence of
media as a democratic force is contradictory, as it remains unknown if increased media systems precede or are a
result of democratic change (Jebril et al., 2013).
In the sections that follow, I will address each of the phenomena discussed above: sociopolitical instability,
nonviolent/violent conflict, democracy, and how new ICTs, traditional media, and press freedoms impact each. In
this chapter, which includes the literature review and theory, I discuss the theory of freedom of expression,
sociopolitical instability, nonviolent and violent conflict, and media and democracy. In Chapter 2, I describe the
methods and data. In Chapter 3, I present the results for the analyses regarding sociopolitical instability and new
ICTs/media freedoms. In Chapter 4, I present the results for the models regarding nonviolent and violent conflict
and how new ICTs and media relate to each type of conflicts. I cover the democracy and media results in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, I present the overall conclusions and implications of this research. I use the term “media systems”
throughout as reference to the overall media environment that includes traditional media, press freedoms, and
penetration rates of new ICTs.
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Literature Review & Theory
Freedom Of The Press & Expression
I start with an explanation of the theory of freedom of expression because it is conceptually related to all
the three areas: sociopolitical instability, conflict, and democracy. Communication scholars have long theorized the
democratic importance of a free and flourishing communication/media system in a country. Freedom of expression
and media freedoms run straight to the heart of democratic theory, in which an informed and engaged citizenry are
fundamental propositions. A free press is essential to a functional democratic state (Lippmann, 1922). Media are
charged with educating the public on matters of social and political concern.
Freedom of expression is closely associated with freedom of the press and contributes to the “marketplace
of ideas” (Mill, 1859, 2010). Ideally, if people can voice their opinions, then through the course of public
deliberation societies reason through the preferred sociopolitical solutions (Habermas, 1989). Freedom of expression
allows people to air their grievances and, theoretically, works as a pressure release valve that assists in keeping
people from desiring and engaging in violent uprisings. In Sub-Sahara Africa, developed media systems that
maintained higher levels of press freedoms have been linked to lower levels of political risk (Roy, 2014). In other
words, countries that have freer media are less likely to experience violent political uprisings and transitions.
Freer and more developed media and ICT systems assist peaceful political change. In part, due to the
increased accessibility of information, developed media systems enrich the public sphere and help provide checks on
the government. A free press contributes to the accountability of the government in various ways. Through
exposition of corruption, following up on campaign promises, and reporting on policy performance, a free press
holds an important role in the democratic progress. The systemic flexibility of democracies discourages
sociopolitical instability and has a positive and significant impact on economic progress, which contributes to
continued stability (Feng, 1997; Persson & Tabellini, 2006).
The freedoms of the press propositions closely link media freedoms with democracy development as well
as sociopolitical stability (Alam & Shah, 2013). Additionally, when a country does experience major conflict, such
as civil wars or major regime-challenging protests, there are reasons to expect press freedoms to be more closely
associated with nonviolent conflict compared to violent conflict. In a UNESCO special report on press freedom and
development, Gusevea et al. (2008) found several correlations between press freedoms (or lack thereof),
militarization, (in)stability and violence. They found that increased military spending positively correlated with
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press freedom restrictions, and that in countries where violence is high, that journalists are more likely to be in
danger, which shapes the media environment. “Generally speaking, in a State where public discussion exists and the
media can deal freely with the problems of society, large-scale violence is not tolerated,” stated Gusevea et al.
(2008, p. 97). While the studies by Alam and Shah (2013) and Gusevea et al. (2008) provided evidence of the
pacifying impacts of press freedoms, neither study included cross-national media and new ICT indicators in the
models with press freedom covariates, which is part of my contribution here.
If people are able to express their grievances, then governments can respond. If the governments do not
respond, and the common grievances hit a popular chord, then the prospects for popular nonviolent organization and
mobilization increase. In general, I expect media freedoms to be positively related to democracy, nonviolent conflict
compared to violent conflict, and negatively related to sociopolitical instability. I discuss each of these areas in
further detail in the following sections. In the next section, I cover the literature and rationale regarding the
relationship in countries between sociopolitical instability and media systems.
Sociopolitical Instability, Media, and New ICTs
A multitude of social, economic, international and domestic political forces converge to hold and agitate
power in any given society. Although there is not consensus in the literature regarding a definition of sociopolitical
(in)stability, it generally refers to events in a country or actions by individuals in a country that challenge or threaten
the social and political order (Miljkovic & Rimal, 2008). Sociopolitical instability can manifest in the form of
general strikes, protests, guerilla warfare, riots, coups, and political assassinations, among other types of
disturbances that threaten governance (Siermann, 1998).
Several cross-national studies have explored the aggregate-level determinants of sociopolitical (in)stability.
A sound and growing economy, at least as perceived by the majority population, is among the most reliable
predictors of a secure position for the controlling government (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Miljkovic & Rimal, 2008).
Instability can hinder development by disrupting daily economies, curbing domestic/foreign investments and
draining public monetary reserves (Barro, 1991; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Schneider & Frey, 1985). Sociopolitical
stability is important to and a result of steady economic growth (Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1992; Feng,
1997). While these studies illuminated important macro-level correlates of sociopolitical instability, media, new
ICTs, and press freedoms are largely absent from the analyses.
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Sociopolitical instability is a sure indicator of strife between governments and at least some of the
population. In various capacities, media and new ICT outlets assist in information distribution regarding the
performance and vulnerability of the empowered government. As media systems become more complex, the more
central role media play in information dispersion to the public (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Groshek (2011)
examined the democratizing and sociopolitical (de)stabilizing effects of the diffusion of the traditional media
technologies--newspapers, radios, and televisions—in 122 countries over a fifty-year period. He used Granger
causality tests to measure media diffusion that preceded democratic advancement and sociopolitical instability. He
found that the adoption of traditional media occurred prior to observable increases in democratic shifts. Specifically,
he stated that “… media diffusion was shown to have Granger-caused democracy only in countries where media
served more information functions or where sociopolitical instability levels were higher,” (Groshek, 2011, p. 1161).
In other words, in countries that had developed media systems or frequently experienced sociopolitical instability,
the likelihood of democratic shifts increased. These are important findings but lack new ICTs and press freedoms in
the analyses.
No matter what type of government, whether autocracy, democracy or somewhere in between, the
government must maintain the compliance and support of the people to remain in power (Sharpe, 1973). Higher
governmental control over the media assists in information control in a society, which could contribute to public
acquiescence to those in power (Castells, 2007). As discussed above, however, the open communication flows of
free-speech/ media encourages more peaceful means of dealing with political grievances and change. With the
diffusion of new ICTs across the globe, and as media systems increase in complexity, maintaining control over
information flows becomes more difficult. The increased access and usage of new ICTs, particularly in freedom of
speech-restricted non-democracies, presents the opportunity for public deliberation about government performance,
vulnerability, and possibly organizing disruptive tactics (Castells, 2012).
Regimes cannot maintain power long by simply repressing the population with coercive tactics (Castells,
2007). In order to sustain control and legitimacy, the state must shape the hearts and minds of the public with
cohesive institutionalized values and norms. Control over media outlets goes a long way in preserving a unified
narrative that drowns out contrary and dissenting information. New ICTs can fundamentally change the informationflow equation by restructuring the vertical top-down landscape to a more horizontal network based system, what
Castells deems “mass self-communication” (2007, p. 238). Building on his past work (Castells, 2000, 2004),
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Castells (2007, 2009) used several case studies to address the questions of societal power relations in the networked
society. Drawing from survey data on the communication practices of social movements, he found support for the
importance of new ICTs to contemporary social movements. New ICTs contributed to new forms of political
mobilization (Castells, 2007, 2009). Additionally, Castells (2009) conducted case studies on the communication
environment in countries including the US, China, and Russian, and proposed a theory of power based on the control
of communication networks. He stated, “…power relations, that is the relations that constitute the foundation of all
societies, as well as the processes challenging institutionalized power relations are increasingly shaped and decided
in the communication field” (Castells, 2007, p. 239). This does not imply that the media are the sole possessors of
power, but that the media provide the arena where much political power is exercised and legitimized.
In the age of globalization, the economic benefits and technological advancements of expanding media
systems, particularly regarding new ICTs, are too great for most authoritarian governments to ignore. If a regime
chooses international isolation over ICT adoption, the risk of losing economic competitiveness increases (Kendzie &
Aragon, 2002). Losing economic competitiveness in the global market can decrease state capacity due to less
revenue to fund military and other government institutions. Adopting new ICTs for economic purposes, however,
increases information outlets and flows, which are harder to control and could spur democratic political socialization
(Kendzie & Aragon, 2002). This is known as the dictator’s dilemma, which suggests that “…economic efficiency
and political efficacy are positively related to each other, and negatively related to authoritarian control” as defined
by Kenzie & Aragon as (2002, p. 109).
The dictator’s dilemma suggests that authoritarian governments must loosen control over media systems in
order to remain economically relevant, but doing so increases chances of sociopolitical instability. The mere
existence of sociopolitical instability is not necessarily indicative of democratization. Authoritarian regimes are
durable and transitions to democracy are long and uncertain procedures. Even in the event of a toppled regime,
relapses into authoritarianism remain possible (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, 2013).
The effectiveness of new ICTs in circumventing authoritarian censorship and surveillance, while
promoting democratic political action, is an important topic. Numerous studies illuminate the positive relationship
between new ICTs and sociopolitical action (see Garrett, 2006, Howard & Hussain, 2013). New ICTs provide the
opportunity and platform to change the dynamics of political communication. Digital technologies can increase
participation levels in sociopolitical deliberations and events by reducing costs of disseminating information,
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promoting group identity, and creating previously inaccessible communities due to spatial and temporal limitations
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Garrett, 2006; Shirky, 2008). By fundamentally changing the way in which
individuals send and receive information and communicate with each other, new ICTs possess the potential of
elevating public discourse, political engagement (Garrett, Bimber, De Zuniga, Heinderyckx, Kelly, & Smith, 2012)
and political action (Howard & Hussain, 2013).
These implications should not, however, be interpreted as a technological determinist argument.
“Technological determinism—the belief that certain technologies are bound to produce certain social, cultural, and
political effects…” is among the most ridiculed lines of thinking among technological skeptics (Morozov, 2011, p.
289). As useful as new ICTs can be for the public, governments also use them for surveillance, censorship,
producing propaganda, and digitally tracking dissenters. In the event of a public display of contention, digital
technologies provide simple avenues for authoritarian regimes to track and round-up dissenting participants and
impose harsh punishments (Morozov, 2011). This played out during the failed Green Revolution in Iran in 2009,
which many in the West deemed the “Twitter Revolution,” as an example of not only the limited capacity of
communication technologies to usher in change, but also the dangers with which the technologies can be used
against the protesters when the resistance fails (Howard & Morozov, 2011; Morozov, 2011).
Morozov puts forth compelling arguments and is one of the most vocal and visible cynics involved in this
debate. Nevertheless, the majority of his arguments are grounded in anecdotal evidence and not in empirical
analysis. I set out here to empirically illuminate the issues surrounding the above debates by analyzing crossnational data regarding the relationships between sociopolitical instability, new ICTs, and press freedoms. These
data will allow me to look at different types of sociopolitical instability, including anti-government demonstrations
and government repression of political opposition.
These arguments highlight the complex sociopolitical and economic dynamics of that exist among these
issues. Media Systems Dependency theory (MSD) provides a useful context for framing these multifaceted social
realities (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). MSD considers the interdependence of macro-level social structures such
as communication technologies, economies, regime type/democracy level, and sociopolitical instability. These
systems interact, exert power over, and are influenced by media, which impacts media products. MSD states that
media effects/dependency are especially increased when two conditions are present. First, when the centrality of
media and functionality of media are high in a society (more complex media systems). Second, media dependency is
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heightened when societies experience conflict and change. In other words, the probability of media dependency
increases when media supply higher numbers of information utilities, which amplifies individual and societal
effects, or when there are greater levels of sociopolitical instability. These two propositions are fundamental to the
scope of this project.
Using the theoretical framework laid out here, I analyze the relationship of new ICTs, media freedoms, and
sociopolitical instability, in Chapter 3. Due to political mobilization and collective action potential of new ICTs, and
extending the logic of Groshek’s (2011) findings to new ICTs, I propose the following three hypotheses:
H1a: Higher levels of new ICT penetration rates relate to sociopolitical instability.
H1b: Higher levels of Internet penetration rates relate to sociopolitical instability.
H1c: Higher levels of cell-phone penetration rates relate to sociopolitical instability.
There is much less known about media systems characteristics in non-democracies. New ICTs could have
important impacts on information creation and circulation in non-democratic countries including organizing and
mobilizing dissident efforts. Additionally, the propositions of the dictator’s dilemma suggest that new ICTs could
assist with circumventing government censorship. As such, I propose the following three hypotheses:
H2a: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of new ICT penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability.
H2b: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of Internet penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability.
H2c: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of cellular-phone penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability.
Due to the pacifying impacts of freedom of expression and the results of the research cited above, I expect free
speech to be negatively related with instability. As such:
H3a: Higher levels of media freedoms negatively relate to sociopolitical instability.
H3b: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of media freedoms negatively relate to
sociopolitical instability.
There is little research and theory regarding the relationship among traditional media indicators and
sociopolitical instability. Building on Groshek (2011) and the sociopolitical proposition of media systems
dependency theory, I propose the following hypothesis:
H4a: Higher rates of traditional media indicators relate with sociopolitical instability in countries.
H4b: In countries that are not full democracies, higher rates of traditional media indicators relate with
sociopolitical instability in countries.
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I will explore the relationship of media systems characteristics and whether certain media/ICT indicators
were related to specific types of sociopolitical instability. This could provide insight into the surveillance/censorship
versus collective action debate. I explored the following research questions:
RQ1a: Do different types of sociopolitical instability in states correlate with higher new ICT rates and
media freedoms?
RQ1b: Do different types of sociopolitical instability in non-democratic states correlate with higher new
ICT rates and media freedoms?
To answer these questions I independently analyzed the eight different types of sociopolitical instability as defined
by Banks’ (2013) and different combinations of the new ICTs (Internet, cell-phone) and traditional media covariates.
I present and discuss the results of these analyses in Chapter 3. In the next section, I outline the theoretical
structure for why media diffusion, new ICT penetration rates, and media freedoms should be more related to
nonviolent resistance campaigns than violent resistance campaigns.
Violent and Nonviolent Conflict
There are many commonalities among the fundamental make-up of social movements, global protest
campaigns, and nonviolent conflicts. New ICTs and press-freedoms likely fundamentally influence and assist these
campaign types in similar ways; however, for the purposes of this section, I distinguish between these phenomena.
In the increasingly interconnected world, these types of conflicts are ever more intertwined. For instance, the
protesters who challenged the controlling powers in Tunisia and Egypt helped inspire the Occupy Movement, which
targeted financial and political elites. Beginning in New York City, the Occupy protests eventually spanned the
globe with hundreds of demonstrations and sit-ins (Castells, 2012; Occupy, 2014). Clearly, new ICTs and social
media were used to spread and publicize these global protest events. Additionally, the LGBT movement is a social
movement that is both local and global. Although these movements are important, interesting, and theoretically
enabled and assisted similarly as the nonviolent campaigns under investigation here, they are not included in these
data. For the purposes of this chapter, I focused strictly on major instances of violent (civil conflict/wars) and
nonviolent campaigns (sustained popular resistance) that sought regime change, anti-occupation, or selfdetermination.
Civil Wars and Nonviolent Conflict
Civil wars research is a major aspect of political science conflict scholarship. “Civil wars and conflicts
arguably inflict more suffering on humanity than any other social phenomenon” stated Blattman and Miguel (2010,
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p. 47). In the last 50 years, the majority of nation-states in the world have experienced internal armed conflict, with
one-third of these conflicts escalating into civil war (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). The most common correlates of
civil war derived from aggregate level studies suggest that civil wars occur in poor countries, countries that are
vulnerable to negative income shocks (Collier & Hoeffler 2002), have weak state institutions, mountainous terrain,
and lightly populated peripheral regions (Fearon & Laitin 2003). On the surface, these variables seem simple and
straightforward, but that is far from true. Poor countries experiencing civil wars are common but reverse causality is
possible. Civil wars are typically destructive to the population, culture, infrastructure, and international trade, thus
presenting the possibility that civil wars drive a country into poverty (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).
Traditionally, research on regime challenging nonviolent conflict was either grouped together with violent
conflict or discounted as less effective. Recent research suggests, however, that it is fruitful to study these
phenomena separately and comparatively (Celestino, 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan,
2011). Chenoweth and Cunningham “…define nonviolent resistance as the application of unarmed civilian power
using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening
physical harm against the opponent” (2013, p. 272). They identified nonviolent campaigns from existing lists,
scholarly research articles, and an expert survey for the construction of the NAVCO dataset.
A growing body of evidence indicates that nonviolent conflict strategies are more effective and swift than
violent means in bringing about regime change, anti-occupation, and/or self-determination campaigns. Chenoweth
and Stephan (2011) were among the first researchers to argue for the separation of violent and nonviolent conflict
pertaining to regime challenging campaigns and they constructed the NAVCO dataset, which included crossnational occurrences of major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns (described in detail in Ch. 2 method
section). Using ordinary least squared and logistic regression models, they found that when comparing maximalist
nonviolent and violent campaigns (i.e. campaigns seeking regime change, anti-occupation, or self-determination)
from 1900-2006, that nonviolent campaigns were more successful in achieving stated goals than violent campaigns,
and that nonviolent campaigns have increased in frequency since the 1970s. Possible contributing factors to this
trend include states’ control of violent tactics and means (i.e. access to weapons and perceived legal use of force) as
compared to citizens, and the global diffusion of knowledge about nonviolent strategies and effectiveness (Schock,
2005; Zunes, Kurtz, & Asher, 1999). One of the defining characteristics of an observable nonviolent campaign is the
initial surge of protest participants at the beginning of the public display of dissent. “The moral, physical,
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informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent
insurgency,” stated Chenoweth & Stephan, (2011, Kindle Locations 346-347).
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) tested the hypothesis that nonviolent and violent campaigns possess different
causes of conflict onset. Challenging the assumption that nonviolent resistance is an antecedent to violent conflict
(see Regan & Norton, 2005), they replicated Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study of civil war onset using the NAVCO
2.0 data. Again, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that civil wars are more likely where resistance opportunities
merge, in countries with weak state capacity, mountainous terrain, or neighboring countries that were engaged in
civil war. Using logistic regression models to analyze the NAVCO 2.0 determinants of violent campaigns,
Chenoweth and Lewis’s (2013) findings are similar to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003), excluding the significance of
ongoing war or a war in a neighboring state.
Common determinates of nonviolent resistance distinctly departed from violent campaign determinants
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Population size was the sole common determinant between violent and nonviolent
campaigns. Flatter terrain and older and more durable authoritarian regimes were the only significant determinants
of nonviolent campaigns. These findings indicate that nonviolent and violent campaigns occur in different types of
countries. “The substantive findings are counter-intuitive and paradoxical: violent campaigns seem to emerge where
resistance is ‘easy,’ whereas nonviolent resistance is emerging where resistance is supposedly ‘difficult’,” stated
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p. 421). The researchers argued that these findings demonstrate that nonviolent
campaign participants are mobilizing under harsh conditions, “challenging many assumptions about the supposed
ineffectiveness of nonviolent resistance against durable authoritarian regimes” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 422).
Nonviolent resistance techniques are likely more effective than violent means due to, at least in part, the lower costs
of participation, which enables larger numbers of contributors. “Nonviolent direct action can seriously challenge
autocratic governments directly or inspiring challengers to stage coups, and may help promote transitions to
democracy” stated Celestino & Gleditsch (p. 387, 2013). Communication scholars may notice the lack of media and
new ICT considerations in this line of research, which could offer important insight into these explorations.
Nonviolent resistance also has important implications for democratic transitions. Celistino & Gleditsch
(2013) found that nonviolent protests are more likely to lead to democratic transitions than violent conflict, which
were more likely to see autocratic regimes resurface. The success of nonviolent conflict is due, in part, to the
division of power and increased motivation to bring elites to the bargaining table because of nonviolent protests.
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Similarly, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) findings indicated that nonviolent campaigns are more likely than violent
campaigns to produce higher levels of democracy in the countries in which they occur. Potential reasons for this
include that the infrastructure of the state is not destroyed through the course of a war, nor is the population
decimated, losing family and friends, which contributes to smoother democratic transitions and lowers probabilities
of backsliding into autocracy (Celistino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Karatnycky & Ackerman,
2005). Additionally, nonviolent campaigns last on average of 3 years while violent campaigns last on average 9
years (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014).
Some of the unanswered questions posed by Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) surrounding nonviolent
resistance include how do campaign initiators mobilize and gain participants, and what assists with the diffusion of a
nonviolent campaign? A growing body of evidence suggests that the community sphere provided by the new ICTs
strengthens social bonds and allows individuals with common grievances to communicate and organize (Castells,
2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013; Rainie & Wellman, 2012).
Regime Challenging Nonviolent Resistance and New ICTs
Closely related to the organizing and mobilizing potential of new ICTs discussed in relation to
sociopolitical instability, the theoretical propositions closely relate to massive collective action campaigns. One of
the most resounding examples of regime challenging collective action is the way in which Filipino citizens used text
messaging to help spur mass protests to bring down Philippine President Joseph Estrada in 2001 (Shirky, 2011).
Enraged by the decision of the Philippine Congress to dismiss evidence of corruption by Estrada during his
impeachment trial, individuals sent millions of text messages throughout the country calling for collective action
against Estrada. The quick and inexpensive text messages helped organize and mobilize over one million people to
converge on downtown Manila. The Philippine Congress quickly overturned its decision and Estrada’s tenure ended.
“Estrada himself blamed ‘the text-messaging generation’ for his downfall,” wrote Shirky (2011, p. 1). While this
example provided by Shirky is convincing regarding the collective action potential of new ICTs, the evidence is
anecdotal and lacking empirical analysis. There is much theorizing about the relationship between new ICTs and
major non-violent conflict, but data driven analyses are lacking. Shirky and Morozov are on opposing ends of these
debates and feuded publically over their respective positions (see Shirky, 2011).
Millions of people in North Africa and the Middle East converged to challenge long-standing dictators
during the Arab Spring. Howard and Hussain (2013) argue that ICTs are having an important impact in Arab
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countries, including pro-democracy movements that are connecting online, engaging the youth, and challenging
censorship practices. Part of Howard and Hussain’s (2013) analyses used descriptive digital data to map and analyze
the online media environment in some of the countries that were apart of the Arab Spring, including Egypt and
Tunisia. They tracked popular dissident-focused hash tags on Twitter and politically oriented blogs in Egypt and
Tunisia using keyword searches. The researchers presented evidence of the cross-boarder contagion impact of social
media by mapping tweets that used neighboring countries hash tags, signifying regional solidarity in the prodemocracy movements. Additionally, they conducted comparative research, using fuzzy-set analysis, of the digital
media environments in the countries that were considered part of the Arab Spring. The main conclusions by Howard
and Hussain (2013), suggested that social media were necessary but not sufficient to bring about democratic change
in the Arab countries. Social media were critical to shaping online debate and revolutionary discourse increased
online prior to many of the protest activities on the ground.
Much of the insight regarding the importance of new ICTs and social media during the Arab Spring came
from the protestors (Alqudsi-ghabra, 2012). Tufekci and Wilson (2012) conducted a survey regarding new ICTs
usage among Egyptian revolution on-the-ground participants. Over twenty-five percent of the survey respondents
reportedly initially heard about the protests on Facebook. Additionally, more than half of the survey respondents
actively documented and shared videos and pictures of the protests online. Nearly half of the revolutionaries used
text messaging for information sharing and organizing (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).
Providing descriptive analyses of the Tahrir Data Project, Wilson and Dunn (2011) offer initial insight into
the complex media anatomy of the Egyptian protest. The Tahrir Data Sets (TDS) contains three data sets with
records of protesters, coordinators, and transnational audiences media usage during the protests. The TDS consists
of a data set compiled from protesters surveys (N= 1,056) gathered by means of snowball sampling. A Twitter data
set compiled from an archive record of tweets that used the #jan25 hashtag (N= 675,713 tweets sent by 106, 563
users between Jan 25 and March 20, 2011). Hashtags are character strings on Twitter that are preceded by the “#”
symbol and allow for search-ability and spontaneous organization (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). The #jan25 hashtag was
one of the first and most widely used hashtags on the days leading up to the protests. The third data set in the TDS
consist of in-depth interviews with 25 individuals who were identified as instrumental actors in coordinating the
dissenting activities and were influential in communicating information.
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The results of this descriptive analysis of the TDS are mixed. Digital media were not profoundly centric in
the communication and organization among active protesters during the revolution (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).
However, the #jan25 data set indicates that Twitter was instrumental in bringing international attention to Cairo and
engaged the global audience in the revolution. Additionally, the researchers identified a small group of “power
users” who controlled the discourse within a lager group of “followers.” Wilson and Dunn state, “…discourse was
dominated by a relatively small group of power users within a massive group of relatively passive users who offered
expressions of support, shared related content, and retweeted power user content” (p. 1269, 2011).
Research pertaining to the collective action enhancing capabilities of new ICTs is not new, however, there
remains a gap in the research at the aggregate-level. As Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) and Chenoweth & Lewis
(2013) provided a first look at the aggregate level predictors of nonviolent and violent conflict, I argue that new
ICTs and media freedoms should be a consideration in this discussion, which is what I aim to provide here.
The diffusion of the Internet and cellular phones in countries indicates that individuals are using these
technologies with increasing frequency. In developing countries, Internet users are typically young, educated, and
live in urban areas such as capital cities and are more politically active than the average person (Howard & Hussain,
2013). Socially conscious and politically active individuals can use new ICTs to communicate, amplify grievances
and civil rights desires, and organize collective action with speed and efficiency. The ability to ‘spread the word’
and gain followers increases the chances that a nonviolent activity will gain supporters. Due to the collective action
enhancing capabilities that new ICTs provide, it is logical that when comparing nonviolent and violent conflict, that
higher levels of new ICTs and press freedoms should be conducive to nonviolent conflict. Due to this theoretical and
empirical framework, I tested the following hypotheses. I present the results and discuss the implications of these
analyses in Chapter 4.
H5: Higher levels of media (tv, newspapers, radio) diffusion positively correlate with nonviolent resistance
campaigns.
H6a: Higher levels of new ICTs in a country positively correlate with nonviolent resistance campaigns
compared to violent resistance campaigns.
H6b: Higher levels of Internet penetration rate in a country positively correlate with nonviolent resistance
campaigns compared to violent resistance campaigns.
H6c: Higher levels of cellular-phone penetration rate in a country positively correlate with nonviolent
resistance campaigns compared to violent resistance campaigns.
H7: Higher levels of media freedoms in a country relate to nonviolent resistance compared to violent
resistance campaigns.

14

I present and discuss the results of the analyses of the previous hypotheses in Chapter 4. In the next section,
I discuss the research and theory regarding the relationship between institutionalized democracy and media systems.
Democracy, Media, New ICTs, and Press Freedoms
Both strong autocracies and strong democracies are less likely to experience internal conflict (Blatmann &
Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This is due, in part, to the ability of strong governments to appease or oppress
public demands. There are, however, reasons to expect democracies to peacefully endure longer than autocracies.
Established democratic institutions allow avenues for peacefully exercising political desires and grievances by way
of voting, campaign contributions, and political leaders responsiveness to public opinion (Persson & Tabellini,
2006). “Democracy provides a stable political environment which reduces unconstitutional government change; yet
along with regime stability, democracy offers flexibility and the opportunity for major government change within
the political system,” stated Feng (1997, p. 392). Peaceful political change is theoretically assisted by freer and
developed media systems due to the increased presence and accessibility of information, government accountability,
and public political engagement (Norris, 2000). Additionally, the systemic flexibility of democracies discourages
sociopolitical instability and has a positive and significant impact on economic progress (Feng, 1997; Persson &
Tabellini, 2006).
Democratic growth is best viewed within the context of complex economic, social, and cultural dynamics
(Frey, 1973; Dervis, 2006). The economic development thesis strongly links democracy with levels of economic
progress (Lipset, 1959). Economic development typically relates to media diffusion and greater press freedoms in
developed countries, which in turn further supports economic productivity and democratic stability (Weaver et al.,
1985). This relationship is reinforcing rather than linear as “…increased resources generally lead directly to
increased levels of education and media development, and increased media development contributes to an increase
in resources, probably because the media are industries that contribute to the economy while consuming energy”
(Weaver et al., 1985, p. 106). Similarly, media development, press freedoms, national development, regime type and
sociopolitical stability are interrelated and not clearly pathologically decipherable (Weaver et al., 1985).
The widely assumed positive roles of mass media influencing increased democratic attitudes in transitional
non-democratic regimes are not clearly supported (Jebril et al., 2013). “Thus, assuming a simple and positive
relationship between media reform—i.e. changes in the quantity and quality of information sources and enhanced
freedom of expression—on the one hand and successful democratization on the other hand can be misleading,”
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according to Jebril et al. (2013, p. 3). Rarely do authoritarian regimes simply dissolve and give way to smooth
democratic transitions, in general, or because of media systems specifically.
A myriad of social, economic, international and domestic political forces converge and conflict in power
struggles in any given society. Importantly, the empowered government must maintain the compliance and support
of the people (Sharpe, 1973). There is evidence that the diffusion of communication technologies (newspapers,
radio, television) are necessary, but not sufficient, to instigate democratization (Buchner, 1988; Denny, 1941;
Winham, 1970), specifically in countries where media penetration rates and political instability are higher (DeFleur
& Ball-Rokeach, 1989; Groshek, 2011). The spread of new ICTs (i.e. Internet, cell phones, social media, etc.)
theoretically makes it more difficult for governments to control information flows, which could add diversity to the
political and social deliberations of the public sphere (Castells, 2009; Garrett, 2006; Shirky, 2009, 2011).
Groshek (2009) found support for the diffusion of the Internet as a predictor of higher levels of democracy.
Using fixed effects regression models, he analyzed cross-national data in 152 countries from 1994-2003. Groshek
found that increased Internet diffusion rates in countries predicted governments that were more democratic. In this
study, Groshek (2009) used similar data to what I use here. I seek to expand this research by using data that are more
recent and by including freedom of the press variables, which could be an important piece of the puzzle.
Media systems (press freedoms & the presence of new ICTs) development and diffusion are appropriately
situated amongst democratic and economic growth. The most widely championed media characteristics, in regards
to democratic progress, are freedom of speech and institutional independence (Norris, 2000). These traits are
important to democracies because of the necessity for pluralistic policy debate, providing a check on government
power and abuses (watch-dog media), and to educate and ultimately engage individuals in the political process
(Norris, 2000).
Freer and more developed media systems can assist with ushering in democratic reforms by reporting on
the transitional procedures without worrying about government aggression. Government legislation assuring media
autonomy and Internet freedoms are key to sustained democratic transitions (Voltmer & Rownsley, 2009). This
dynamic can be perceived as a co-evolution between emerging democratic institutions while the press steadily
liberalizes with assurances from the government.
Democratic media institutionalization does not occur immediately and universally. Both media institutions
and media personnel retain remnants of the logic, values, and norms of existence under the previous government,
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but in transitional democracies communication freedoms are typically widely supported (Voltmer & Rownsley,
2009). These new institutional norms require new roles for media personnel. One of the most fundamental
democratic roles assigned to the media is performing ‘watch-dog’ functions of holding government actors
accountable (Gurevitch & Blummler; Schudson, 1995; Voltmer, 2006). One can see how this presents an
uncomfortable and challenging scenario for transitional governments. That is, providing government supported
communication freedoms to organizations that use those freedoms to monitor the government. Nevertheless, it is a
widely agreed upon fundamental principle for functional democracies, at least in the Anglo-American traditions
(Norris, 2000; Randall, 1993; Schudson, 1995).
In transitional states, media along with societies undergo socialization periods in which behaviors and
attitudes adapt and reflect the new sociopolitical realities. The diffusion of new ICTs and the emergence of social
media presents new and greater opportunities for democratic transitions. New ICTs could help transitional societies
due to more pluralistic online publications. Along with bloggers and social media users, online publications can
break away from the previously dominant traditional media that may still have ties to old-world elites and help set
the political agenda. Free and developed media systems are important to transitional democracies by contributing to
sustained discourse and assist in preventing backsliding to autocracy (Randall, 1993). Media systems also contribute
to socialization of public by influencing political orientations (Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007).
Following the logic of the previous sections of developed and free media systems relating to sociopolitical
(in)stability and nonviolent rather than violent conflict, it is likely that these traits will also be correlated with higher
levels of institutionalized democracies. I tested the following hypotheses and presented the results and implications
in Chapter 5.
H8a: Higher levels of new ICT penetration rate positively correlate to institutionalized democratic levels.
H8b: Higher levels of Internet penetration rate in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels.
H8c: Higher levels of cellular-phone penetration rates in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels.
H9: Higher levels of traditional media penetration rate in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels.
H10: Higher levels of media freedoms in a country positively correlate to institutionalized democratic
levels.
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As it is difficult to distinguish and decipher the directionality of the media/democracy relationship, looking at the
non-democratic countries and their levels of media development and freedom can provide insight into the possible
co-evolution of this relationship.
H11a: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of new ICTs penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels.
H11b: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of Internet penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels.
H11c: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of cell-phone penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels.
H12: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of traditional media penetration rate in a
country positively correlate to institutionalized democratic levels.
H13: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of media freedoms in a country are positively
correlated to institutionalized democratic levels.
Sociopolitical instability could possibly be a sign of democratization and/or countries that are more
democratic are more likely to experience sociopolitical instability. Moreover, media systems dependency theory
postulates that the probability of media dependency increases when media supply higher numbers of information
utilities or when there are greater levels of sociopolitical instability. To further explore this possibility, I test the
following hypotheses:
H14: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, higher levels of new ICTs relate to higher
levels of institutionalized democracy.
H15: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, higher levels of traditional media rates relate to
higher levels of institutionalized democracy.
H16: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, press freedoms relate to higher levels of
institutionalized democracy.
In the next section, I describe the data and methods I used for testing all of the hypotheses and exploring
the research questions.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS & DATA
Using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and logistic regression models, I conducted cross-national,
aggregate-level data analyses to gain greater understanding of media systems characteristics in countries as related
to sociopolitical events, conflicts, and government types. The primary concepts of these analyses were the presence
of communication technologies in a given country and how these ICTs & media correlated to political instability,
nonviolent/violent conflict, and democracy/autocracy. The unit of analysis for data collection for sociopolitical
instability and democracy were the nation-year, and campaign-year was used for the nonviolent/violent conflict
analysis. I used data collected from various organizations including the Banks’ Cross-Polity Time-Series Database,
NAVCO 2.0, the United Nations, the World Bank, Freedom House, and Groshek (2011). There are limitations to
and skepticism about national-level measures; however, many organizations collect and maintain reliable global data
suitable for cross-national analyses (van Dijk 2005). Diffusion of communication technologies research has
demonstrated that ICTs spread at similar rates in a variety of countries (Livingstone, 2003; Rodgers, 2003). This
indicates that knowledge can be derived from cross-national analyses pertaining to the diffusion of ICTs when
controlling for the appropriate variables.
Model Estimation: I have data measured for each country over time. Violations of model assumptions,
including autocorrelated errors and heteroskedasticity, often occur with models estimated using panel (or ‘‘pooled’’)
data (Greene 2003; Gujarati 2003). As such, for Chapters 3 & 5 I used models in which I estimate pooled models
using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE; Beck and Katz 1995); the model estimated assumes a heteroskedastic
error structure across panels and is estimated using panel-specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation (Garand,
2010). In Chapter 4, I used logit regression models.
Variables
Sociopolitical Instability
These variables come from the Banks’ Cross-Polity Time-Series Database, which includes data on 197
countries from 1815-2012, and maintain eight variables of domestic conflict behavior and a combined instability
index, including:
Anti-government Demonstrations. 100 or more people peacefully assembled in public with the intention
of airing grievances regarding policies or opposition to authority. This does not include instances of anti-foreign
occupation or intervention.
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Purges. Targeted oppression of political opposition by way of imprisonment or death. Political opposition
could be within the existing regime or member of opposing party/group.
Assassinations. Targeted killing of or attempt to kill any high-ranking government official or politician.
Guerrilla Warfare. Any armed resistance by non-governmental forces for the purpose of regime change.
These tactics include bombings, sabotage, or other armed activities.
Major Government Crises. Any catastrophic event or crisis that puts the controlling regime at risk of
losing power- not including obvious attempts to overthrow the government.
Riots. Physically violent episodes of public discontent including more than 100 citizens.
Revolutions. Any unlawful, irregular, or forced turnover, or attempted turnover, of top government
officials including armed dissident campaigns with the purpose of gaining autonomy from the central government.
General Strikes. Any strike of 1,000 or more workers, including industrial or service, that is composed of
more than one employer with grievances aimed at national government policies or authority.
Political instability Index. Used for weighted conflict measures, the specific weights being variable. As of
October 2007 the values entered were: Assassinations (25), Strikes (20), Guerrilla Warfare (100), Government
Crises (20), Purges (20), Riots (25), Revolutions (150), and Anti-Government Demonstrations (10). Multiply the
value for each variable times the specific weights; multiply that sum of products by 100 and divide the result by 8 to
confirm the value for domestic9.
Violent and Nonviolent Regime Challenging Campaigns
NAVCO 2.0 (Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes) data was developed by Chenoweth &
Lewis (2013). The NAVCO data identify campaigns ranging from 1945-2006, defined as ‘a series of observable,
continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective, directed against the state’, with start
and end dates, and classify whether these are primarily nonviolent or violent. Nonviolent campaign identification
comes from existing lists and an expert survey, and violent campaigns from existing data on wars, namely the
Correlates of War data and Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) civil conflicts data. Nonviolent campaigns,
coded =1, and Violent campaigns =0. In the NAVCO 2.0 data, there are two measures for campaign type. The first
is deemed the “prim_method” campaign-identifying variable, which allows for the coding of the campaign to
change over time. The second is derived from the NAVCO 1.1 data (navco1designation), and signifies whether or
not the campaign was predominately nonviolent or violent. This measure remains static across years of the
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campaign. For this study, I am interested with conflict onset, as the presence of new ICTs and press freedoms in a
country could contribute to a public discussion and atmosphere that may influence the traits of a resistance campaign
that is violent or nonviolent. As such, I used the NAVCO 1.1 campaign designation variable.
Democracy
I used the “Polity 2” score as the democracy measure. The “Polity 2” score comes from the Polity IV
database, which models national-level democracy with scores ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full
democracy). Following other work, I considered states democracies if they had a Polity score above 6 (Gleditsch &
Ward, 2006; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). I considered states non-democracies with Polity scores of 6 and below,
which were used in the analyses of non-democracies.
Media-ICTs
Newspaper, television, and radio (1943-2006) measurements come from the UN Statistical Yearbook,
included in the Banks’ dataset, and measured as penetration rate per country, per capita (per 1000). There were
limitations to the Banks data media variables (radio, tv, newspaper) and in most cases only included data up to 1999.
Groshek (2011) updated these data for 120 countries through 2003. I supplemented the data used here with
Groshek’s data. The data run from 1946-2003 for the traditional media variables.
I conducted a factor analysis for all five of the media variables (newspaper, tv, radio, internet, cell). The
analysis suggested that it is appropriate to combine the traditional media variables (newspapers, tv, radio) into a
single variable (oldmedia). The second factor loading produced justification for combing the new ICT variables
(internet, cell) into a single variable (newmedia). Table 2.1 displays the results of the factor analysis.
Table 2.1 Factor Analysis for Media Variables
Variables
Factor 1
z-cell
0.7785
z-net
0.8001
z-TV
0.8643
z-radio
0.7128
z-newspaper
0.7006
Eigenvalue
2.99
Proportion of Variance
.60

Factor 2
-0.5582
-0.5192
0.0929
0.5556
0.5333
1.20
.24

Uniqueness
.08
.09
.24
.18
.22

The new media variables (cell, internet) included the years 1990-2012. Internet and cell-phone data (19902012) measurements include penetration rate per country, per capita (100 people) and come from the World Bank. I
used different combinations of the variable coefficients. The high correlation between the Internet and cell-phone
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variable coefficients (r=.81), suggests that testing these variables separately as well as combined in the form of the
new ICT variable was statistically appropriate. In some of the models, however, I used the Internet and cell-phone
indicators in the same model individually for comparative purposes. Although the Internet and cell-phone variable
coefficients correlated, the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for the coefficients (Internet = 5.0, cell=3.1, mean
VIF=2.32) when included in the models together were well within the range of acceptability, indicating that
multicollinearity was not in issue in these models. A common rule of thumb for multicollinearity of variable
coefficients in regression models is a VIF score of 10 or greater (UCLA, 2014). Table 2.2 displays the Variance
Inflation Factor scores.
Table 2.2 Variance Inflation Factor Scores
Variable
VIF
cell
3.2
net
5.0
Mean VIF
2.32
Table 2.3 (below) displays the descriptive statistics for all media variables.
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variables
Obs
Mean
Cell
4517
31.60
Internet
3676
16.00
Newspaper
9385
110.36
Radio
9385
110.40
TV
9385
119.89
Full Free Press
6021
34
Part Free Press
6021
27
Conflict
1553
.21
Instability
9931
883.18
Polity
8853
.50
GDP
8276
6338.06
Population
10211
206.14

Std. Dev.
43.50
23.24
141.86
316.65
174.53
.47
.45
.41
1965.40
7.50
13181.41
1093.85

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-10
35.40
.10

Max
205.3
96
900
6841
2264
1
1
1
51625
10
193892
18790

Freedom House Press Freedoms Indicator (1980-2013). The Freedom of the Press index is an annual survey of
media independence in 197 countries and territories. The annual index contains a comprehensive data set available
on global media freedom. The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and Internet freedom in every country in
the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical rankings and categorizes each country's
media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." The freedom of the press ratings came from Freedom House. Each
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year each country in the data set received a rating of Not Free (NF), Part Free (PF), or Full Free (FF). I coded these
variables as NF=0, PF=1, FF=2. I then dummy coded the variables as FF=1 all others =0, and PF=1 all
others=0 to create two measures. Including both the dummy variables in the models allows for the interpretation of
going from Not Free to Full Free (full free press), and Not Free to Part Free (partially free press) in a country.
Income. The Banks’ data includes measures of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in U.S. dollars.
Population. The Banks’ data includes population figures across nations per capita.
In the next chapter, I present and discuss the results of the analyses regarding the relationship between
sociopolitical instability in countries and media systems characteristics.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Hypotheses Tests for Sociopolitical Instability, New ICTs, Media, and Press Freedoms
Table 3.1 shows the results for the panel corrected standard error estimates of aggregate-level models in
which I tested the hypotheses regarding the positive relationship between sociopolitical instability and media/ICTs
across all countries.
H1a: Higher levels of new ICT penetration rates relate to sociopolitical instability
The new ICT (b= -83.3, z= -1.4) variable coefficient was not statistically significant (not displayed), thus, I
did not find full support for the relationship of new ICTs and sociopolitical instability across all countries.
H1b: Higher levels of Internet penetration rates relate to sociopolitical instability
The models that included the Internet variable coefficient without the cell-phone variable did not produce
statically significant coefficients, so I did not find full support for this hypothesis, however, I did find partial
support. In Model 2, which included the cell-phone (b= -4.8, z= -2.91) and Internet (b=8.6, z=2.20) variables
together, the Internet variable coefficient was statistically significant and in the expected direction, offering partial
support for H1b.
Model 3, which included the Internet (b=12.2, z=2.93) and cell-phone (b= -3.8, z= -2.23) variable
coefficients for the years 2000-2012. In the models that included the Internet and mobile phone variables together,
the results indicated that higher rates of Internet penetration related to higher levels of sociopolitical instability and
higher levels of cell-phone penetration rates negatively correlated with sociopolitical instability in countries.
H3a: Higher levels of media freedoms will negatively relate to sociopolitical instability
As shown in Table 3.1, the analyses provided evidence that supported the hypothesis in several models. For
instance, in Model 1, the full free press (b= -798, z= -4.93) variable coefficient was highly statistically significant
and negative, suggesting that countries that go from a no free press rating to a full free press rating are substantially
less likely to experience episodes of sociopolitical instability than countries that have no freedom of speech
protections. In both of the models that included the traditional media variable coefficients (4 & 5), the full free press
variable coefficients were statistically significant in the expected negative direction. The part free press variable
coefficients were not statistically significant in any of the models, indicating that going from a no free press rating to
a partial free press rating had no observable impact on sociopolitical instability in these models.
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Table 3.1 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability, New ICTs, Media and Press Freedoms across All Countries
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
2000-2012
1980-2003
1980-2003
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Newspaper
.41 (.86)
Radio
.30 (1.58)
TV
-1.5 (-3.86)***
Old Media
-111.4 (-1.81)*
Internet
8.6 (2.20)**
12.2 (2.93)***
Cell Phone
-2.53 (-2.32)**
-4.8 (-2.91)***
-3.8 (-2.23)**
New ICTs
Full Free -798 (-4.93)***
-765 (-4.15)***
-1292(-6.25)***
-438 (-2.56)**
-419.8 (-2.41)**
Part Free
-205 (-1.53)
-50.5 (-.31)
-253 (-1.30)
16.7 (.14)
31.3 (.26)
Polity
23.04 (1.93)*
32.1 (2.44)**
54.5 (3.40)***
33.6 (3.16)***
33.2 (3.11)***
Population
.83 (3.24)***
.26 (1.40)
.09 (.54)
.41 (1.95)*
.46 (2.02)**
GDP
-.00 (-2.67)***
-.01 (-3.52)***
-.01 (-2.80)***
-.02 (-3.47)***
-.02 (-6.30)***
Intercept 1190(12.81)***
1228 (12.1)***
1164 (10.2)***
1186(10.9)***
1103 (10.9)***
N
3576 (159)
2952 (158)
1949 (157)
3301 (156)
Wald χ2
88.96
70.73
80.4
115.27
Prob>χ2
.000
.000
.000
.00
R2
.05
.11
.09
.07
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a heteroskedastic error
structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
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3301 (156)
150.5
.00
.07

H4a: Higher rates of traditional media indicators relate with sociopolitical instability in countries
In Model 4, I included the traditional media variables newspaper, radio and television. The television (b= 1.5, z= -3.8) variable coefficient was negative and statistically significant, while the newspaper (b=.41, z=.86) and
radio (b=.30, z=1.58) variable coefficients were not statistically significant. In Model 5, I included the old media
variable, which was the summed standardized scores of the three traditional media variable coefficients. The old
media (b= -111.4, z= -1.81) variable coefficient was negative and statistically significant, suggesting that higher
rates of traditional media diffusion were negatively correlated with instances of sociopolitical instability in
countries. The results of both of these models are in opposition direction than hypothesized.
Several of the control variable coefficients were statistically significant. The polity variable coefficients
were positive and statistically significant in all of the models, indicating that countries that are more democratic are
more likely to experience sociopolitical instability. The GDP variable coefficients were negative and statistically
significant in all of the models, suggesting that as GDP levels increase the probabilities of a country experiencing
sociopolitical instability decrease. Also, in 3 of the 5 displayed models, the population variable coefficients were
positive and statistically significant.
In the next section, I present the results from the analysis into the research question regarding different
types of sociopolitical instability across all countries.
RQ1a: Do different types of sociopolitical instability in states correlate with higher new ICT rates and media
freedoms?
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 display the results of the panel corrected standard error estimates of aggregate-level
models of sociopolitical instability types. I tested the individual sociopolitical types (DV) using the new ICT
variable (Table 3.2), the Internet variable (Table 3.3), and the cell-phone variable (Table 3.4) as the main
independent variables along with the previously included control variables.
In Table 3.2, I reported the coefficients for the analyses that included the new ICT variable as one of the
primary independent variables. The new ICT variable coefficients were positive and statistically significant in
several of models. The new ICTs variable coefficients were strong predictors of anti-government demonstrations
(b=.57, z=4.89), general strikes (b=.05 , z=1.73), purges (b=.10, z=5.87 ), riots (b= .20, z=3.74), and guerrilla
warfare (b=.11 , z=2.66). The new ICTs (b= -.04, z= -1.77) variable coefficient was negatively statistically
significantly related to revolutions.
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Table 3.2 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability Types, New ICTs and Press
Freedoms across All Countries
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
New ICTs
.57 (4.89)***
.05 (1.73)*
.10 (5.87)***
.20 (3.74)***
Full Free Press
-.21 (-.68)
-.03 (-.49)
.02 (.31)
-.18 (-1.14)
Part Free Press
-.04 (-.13)
-.03 (-.79)
.00 (.01)
.02 (.17)
Population
.00 (1.41)
.00 (1.48)
-4.97 (-.00)
.00 (1.59)
GDP
-1.3 (-.11)
7.3 (.38)
-4.4 (-3.88)***
-7.06 (-2.12)**
Polity
-.02 (-1.41)
.00 (1.17)
-.01 (-2.23)**
-.01 (-1.11)
Cons
.66 (2.84)***
.09 (2.84)***
.10 (5.11)***
.38 (3.31)***
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons

1852 (158)
54.64
.00
.02

1853 (158)
18.0
.00
.08

1853 (158)
37.24
.00
.09

1852 (158)
50.16
.00
.07

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.11 (2.66)***
-.05 (-.68)
.00 (.04)
.00 (1.31)
-7.83 (-3.36)***
-.00 (-.00)
.21 (6.27)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.04 (-1.77)*
-.10 (-1.37)
-.01 (-.18)
.00 (.20)
-3.12 (-2.76)***
-.00 (-.41)
.30 (6.82)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.45)
.00 (.06)
.04 (1.30)
.00 (1.28)
1.14 (.01)
.00 (1.05)
.13 (5.99)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (.03)
-.51 (-3.32)***
-.34 (-2.80)***
-.00 (1.42)
-1.59 (-.74)
.03 (3.23)***
.35 (4.27)***

N
1853 (158)
1853 (158)
1853 (158)
1853 (158)
Wald χ2
18.15
50.16
9.01
12.81
Prob>χ2
.00
.00
.17
.05
R2
.01
.07
.07
.03
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
The media freedoms variable coefficients failed to reach statistical significance in all of the models except
the political assassinations model, in which both the full free (b= -.51, z= -3.32) and part free (b= -.34, z= -2.8)
variable coefficients were negative and highly statistically significant. This suggests that political assassinations are
less likely in countries that have higher levels of freedom of the press ratings.
In Table 3.3, I displayed the coefficients for the models that included the Internet variable. These results
were similar to the new ICTs variable models. The Internet variable coefficients were statistically significant and
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Table 3.3 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability Types, Internet and Press
Freedoms across All Countries
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Internet
.04 (5.68)***
.00 (2.13)**
.00 (4.21)***
.01 (4.06)***
Full Free Press
-.30 (-.83)
-.01 (-.18)
-.08 (-1.93)**
-.22 (-1.30)
Part Free Press
-.07 (-.19)
-.02 (-.39)
-.00 (-.22)
.07 (.38)
Population
.00 (1.13)
.00 (1.47)
9.88 (.12)
.00 (1.38)
GDP
-.00 (-1.34)
-1.83 (-.79)
-2.72 (-2.30)**
-.00 (-2.64)***
Polity
-.04 (-1.63)*
.00 (.79)
-.00 (-1.54)
-.01 (-1.42)
Cons
.43 (1.52)
.05 (1.28)
.05 (2.60)***
.30 (2.19)**
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
Internet
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons

1675 (157)
46.28
.00
.03

1675 (157)
16.65
.01
.09

1675 (157)
24.99
.00
.08

1674 (157)
47.11
.00
.01

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.01 (2.18)**
-.03 (-.31)
.02 (.47)
.00 (1.23)
-8.98 (-2.74)***
-.00 (-.18)
.15 (4.07)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-2.28)**
-.03 (-.46)
.02 (.37)
-2.60 (-.04)
-1.99 (-1.71)*
-.00 (-.71)
.26 (8.51)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.47)
.00 (.09)
.04 (1.08)
.00 (.18)
6.67 (.35)
.00 (.41)
.17 (5.91)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (.13)
-.53 (-2.99)***
-.40 (-2.60)***
-.00 (-1.91)*
-2.06 (-.73)
.03 (2.90)***
.40 (4.27)***

N
1675 (157)
1675 (157)
1675 (157)
1657 (157)
Wald χ2
11.80
31.19
2.66
12.62
Prob>χ2
.07
.00
.85
.05
R2
.01
.11
.08
.03
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
positive in the models for anti-government demonstrations (b= .04, z= 5.68), general strikes (b=.00, z= 2.13), purges
(b=.00, z=4.21), riots (b=.01 , z=4.06), and guerrilla warfare (b=.01 , z=2.18); while the coefficient in the
revolutions (b= -.00, z= -2.28) model was significant and negative. These results suggest that higher levels of
Internet penetration rates in a country were positively related to instances of anti-government demonstrations,
general strikes, purges, riots, guerrilla warfare, and negatively related to revolutions. Moreover, higher levels of
press freedoms, both full-free press (b= -.53, z= -2.99) and part-free press (b= -.40, z= -2.60) were negatively related
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to political assassinations. That is, going from no press freedoms to full free press ratings and partial free press
ratings reduced the likelihood of political assassinations.
In Table 3.4, I showed the results for the models that included the cell-phone variable coefficients. The
results of these analyses were similar to the new ICTs and Internet variable models except for the coefficient in the
general strikes model was not statistically significant. The cell-phone variable coefficient was positive and
statistically significant in the models for anti-government demonstrations (b=.01 , z= 3.43), purges (b=.00 , z=6.07),
Table 3.4 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability, Cell-Phones, and Press
Freedoms across All Countries
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1980-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Cell-Phone
.01 (3.43)***
.00 (1.19)
.00 (6.07)***
.00 (2.85)***
Full Free Press
-.25 (-.8)
-.04 (-.67)
.01 (.27)
-.20 (-1.15)
Part Free Press
-.05 (-.15)
-.03 (-.90)
-.00 (-.05)
.02 (.10)
Population
.00 (1.36)
.00 (1.37)
.00 (.17)
.00 (2.08)**
GDP
.00 (1.57)
2.30 (1.30)
-2.35 (-1.86)*
-2.56 (-.85)
Polity
-.02 (-1.10)
.01 (1.39)
-.01 (-2.18)**
-.01 (-.85)
Cons
.32 (1.13)
.07 (1.86)*
.02 (1.07)
.24 (1.68)*
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
Cell-Phone
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons

1847 (158)
36.86
.00
.02

1848 (158)
14.68
.03
.08

1848 (158)
39.17
.00
.10

1847 (158)
44.79
.00
.01

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (2.62)***
-.05 (-.73)
.00 (.06)
.00 (1.40)
-5.62 (-3.17)***
.00 (.24)
.13 (3.67)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-1.67)*
-.09 (-1.34)
-.01 (-.17)
.00 (.24)
-3.70 (-3.53)***
-.00 (-.47)
.30 (7.27)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.78)
.00 (.05)
.04 (1.30)
.00 (1.24)
1.60 (.01)
.00 (1.12)
.15 (5.77)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.17)
-.51 (-3.33)***
-.35 (-2.78)***
-.00 (-1.38)
-1.21 (-1.01)
.03 (3.26)***
.40 (4.27)***

N
1848 (158)
1848 (158)
1848 (158)
1848 (158)
Wald χ2
20.70
54.86
9.22
12.62
Prob>χ2
.00
.00
.16
.05
R2
.01
.07
.07
.03
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
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riots (b=.00, z=2.85), and guerrilla warfare (b=.00 , z=2.62); while the coefficient in the revolutions (b= -.00, z= 1.67) model was significant and negative.
These results indicate that higher levels of cell phone penetration rates in a country are positively related to
instances of anti-government demonstrations, purges, riots, guerrilla warfare, and negatively related to revolutions.
Moreover, higher levels of press freedoms, both full-free press (b= -.51, z= -3.33) and part-free press (b= -.35, z= 2.78) are negatively related to political assassinations. Suggesting that, going from no press freedoms to full free
press ratings and partial free press ratings reduced the likelihood of political assassinations. In the next section, I
present the results for the analyses that included the countries that were not full-democracies.
Sociopolitical Instability, New ICTs and Press Freedoms in Non-Democracies
For the analyses of the countries that were not fully democratic, I included all the countries that maintained
a ranking of less than 7 in the Polity 2 democracy-autocracy scale (21-point scale: -10=full autocracy to 10=full
democracy). Table 3.5 shows the results for the models in which I tested the H2a, H2b, H2c.
H2a: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of new ICT penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability
The new ICT variable (b=125.1, z=1.02) coefficient did not reach statistical significance in the model that
included the years 1990-2012 (not shown). In Model 3, I reported the coefficient for the new ICT (b=306, z=1.82)
variable, which was statistically significant, indicating that increased levels of new ICTs in a country were related to
more instances of sociopolitical instability, which supports the hypothesis.
H2b: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of Internet penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability
In Models 1 & 2, I analyzed the relationship spanning the country-years
1990-2012. In Model 2, the Internet (b=21.4, z=2.08) variable coefficient was statistically significant and in the
expected direction, indicating that as Internet adoption rate increased in countries, the occurrences of sociopolitical
instability increased, supporting the hypothesis.
In Model 1, I included both the Internet and cell-phone variables. The Internet (b=34.3, z=3.40) variable
coefficient was highly statistically significant. The Internet variable coefficient was positive, suggesting that as
Internet penetrations rates increased in a country then the likelihood of sociopolitical instability also increased,
supporting the hypothesis.
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Table 3.5 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability, New ICTs, Media and
Press Freedoms in Non-Democracies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
2000-2012
2000-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Internet
34.3 (3.40)***
21.4 (2.08)**
44.7 (3.63)***
Cell Phone
-6.2 (-2.23)**
-7.4 (-2.36)**
New ICTs
306 (1.82)*
Full Free Press
-652 (-2.16)**
-598 (-2.03)**
-756 (-2.41)**
-968 (-2.69)***
Part Free Press
257 (1.30)
255 (1.31)
-39.3 (-.15)
-32.01 (-.12)
Polity
71.6(4.11)***
59.8 (3.18)***
96.3 (4.20)***
112.2 (4.89)***
Population
-.31 (-2.30)**
.09 (.42)
.02 (.13)
-.26 (-1.61)
GDP
-.03 (-3.89)***
-.03 (-3.10)***
-.03 (-2.09)**
-.04 (-2.84)***
Cons
1300 (11.14)***
1158(10.64)***
1351 (10.26)***
1303 (9.79)***
N
Wald chi2
Prob>chi2
R2

1500 (109)
64.62
.000
.18

1506 (109)
39.81
.000
.16

1013 (92)
26.81
.000
.17

Variables

(5)
2000-2012
b (z)

(6)
1980-2003
b (z)
2.6 (2.14)**
.96 (1.51)
-3.4 (-3.74)***

(7)
1980-2003
b (z)

Newspaper
Radio
TV
Old Media
Internet
Cell Phone
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Polity
Population
GDP
Cons

979 (92)
43.48
.000
.21

47 (.28)
29.6 (3.03)***
-873 (-2.37)**
-29.6 (-.11)
105 (4.55)***
-.19 (-1.16)
-.04 (-2.88)***
1150 (9.96)***

-641 (-2.27)**
124 (.88)
76.5 (4.75)***
.00 (1.32)
-.05 (-1.54)
1593 (10.78)***

-567 (-1.93)*
141 (.98)
85.03 (5.17)***
.00 (.36)
-.07 (-2.52)**
1720 (12.8)***

N
984 (92)
1589 (89)
1589 (89)
Wald chi2
34.32
79.21
74.79
Prob>chi2
.000
.00
.00
R2
.19
.11
.10
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
Looking at the years 2000-2012, Model 5 shows the results for the analysis that included the Internet
(b=29.6, z=3.03) variable coefficient. In this model, the Internet variable coefficient was highly statistically
significant and positive, also supporting the hypothesis. This relationship held in Model 4, which included both the
Internet (b=44.7, z=3.63) and cell-phone (b=-7.4, z=-2.36) variable coefficients.
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H2c: In countries that are not full democracies, higher levels of cellular-phone penetration rates relate to
sociopolitical instability
In the model that I included the cell-phone covariate independently, the coefficient (b=.72, z=.35) did not
reach statistical significance (not shown). In the models that included the Internet and cell-phone variables together
(Models 1 & 4), the cell-phone variable coefficients were negative and statistically significant. For instance, in
Model 1, the cell-phone (b= -.6.2, z= -2.23) variable coefficient was negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that in countries where cell-phone penetration rates increased, then the likelihood of sociopolitical instability
episodes decreased. This finding is in the opposite direction of the hypothesis.
H3b: In countries that are not full-democracies, higher levels of media freedoms will negatively relate to
sociopolitical instability
The full free press variable coefficients were statistically significant and negative across all models. This
suggests that going from a not free press rating to a full free press rating is related to a lack of sociopolitical
instability in countries, supporting the hypothesis. The full free press variable coefficients were statistically
significant, but the part free press variable coefficients were not statistically significant in any of the models.
H4b: In countries that are not full democracies, higher rates of traditional media indicators relate with
sociopolitical instability in countries
In Models 6 and 7, I analyzed the traditional media indicators from the years 1980-2003. In Model 6, the
newspaper (b= 2.6, z= 2.14) variable coefficient was positive and statistically significant, and the tv (b= -3.4, z= 3.74) variable coefficient was negative and statistically significant. These findings suggest that increased levels of
newspapers were related to increased occurrences of sociopolitical instability in a country, partially supporting the
hypothesis. Increased levels of televisions in a country correlated with the absence of sociopolitical instability,
moving in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. The radio variable coefficient was not statistically significant.
The old media variable coefficient, in Model 7, did not reach statistical significance.
Sociopolitical Instability Types and New ICTs in Non-Democracies
In this section, I investigated whether certain types of sociopolitical instability in non-democracies were
more related to new ICTs and media freedoms than others.
RQ1b: Do different types of sociopolitical instability in non-democratic states correlate with higher new ICT
rates and media freedoms?
I displayed the results of the panel corrected standard error estimates of aggregate-level models of
sociopolitical instability types in non-democracies in the tables below. Again, I tested the individual sociopolitical
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types (DV) using the new ICT variable (Table 3.6), the Internet variable (Table 3.7), and the cell-phone variable
(Table 3.8) as the main independent variables along with the previously included control variables.
Table 3.6 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability Types, New ICTs and Press
Freedoms in Non-Democracies
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
New ICTs
1.2 (6.31)***
.01 (.4)
.11 (4.58)***
.51 (4.86)***
Full Free Press
-.12 (-.32)
-.11 (-2.1)**
.02 (.59)
.04 (.24)
Part Free Press
.03 (.1)
-.00 (-.07)
.02 (.71)
.11 (.62)
Population
.00 (1.37)
.00 (1.91)*
-.00 (-.24)
.00 (2.01)**
GDP
-.00 (-5.33)***
-6.5 (-.3)
-2.83 (-1.86)*
-.00 (-4.52)***
Polity
-.02 (-.69)
.00 (1.8)*
-.00 (-.79)
-.01 (-.87)
Cons
.99 (3.75)***
.12 (3.58)***
.11 (5.10)***
.45 (3.78)***
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons

1067 (88)
54.03
.00
.05

1067 (88)
11.73
.07
.09

1067 (88)
23.87
.00
.10

1067 (88)
50.59
.00
.03

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.12 (1.63)+
-.04 (-.7)
-.00 (-.03)
-.00 (-.58)
-8.53 (-2.37)**
-.00 (-.34)
.24 (4.58)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.04 (-1.43)
-.08 (-.98)
.02 (.45)
.00 (.17)
-4.37 (-2.62)***
-.00 (-.01)
.27 (6.14)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.01 (-.56)
-.01 (-.18)
.04 (1.21)
.00 (1.18)
1.20 (.53)
.01 (2.07)**
.14 (5.28)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
.04 (1.30)
-.13 (-1.84)*
-.07(-1.50)
6.47 (.21)
-4.94 (-2.6)***
.01 (1.36)
.20 (4.87)***

N
1067 (88)
1067 (88)
1067 (88)
1067 (88)
Wald χ2
9.62
33.96
9.62
10.77
Prob>χ2
.14
.00
.14
.09
R2
.001
.07
.09
.04
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
In Table 3.6, I reported the coefficients for the analyses that included the new ICT variable as one of the
primary independent variables. The new ICT variable coefficients were positive and statistically significant in
several of models. The new ICTs variable coefficients were strong predictors of anti-government demonstrations
(b=1.2, z=6.31), purges (b=.11 z=4.58), riots (b= .51, z=4.86), and was approaching statistical significance in the
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guerrilla warfare (b=.11 , z=2.66) model. The media freedoms variable coefficients failed to reach statistical
significance in several models but achieved significance in the political assassinations (b= -.13, z= -1.84) and
general strikes (b= -.11, z= -2.1) models. This suggests that political assassinations and general strikes are less likely
in countries that have full free press freedom press ratings compared to not free press ratings.

Table 3.7 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability Types, Internet and Press
Freedoms in Non-Democracies
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Internet
.10 (6.14)***
.00 (.68)
.00 (3.36)***
.03 (5.02)***
Full Free Press
-.3 (-.72)
-.1 (-1.55)
.01 (.38)
.02 (.14)
Part Free Press
-.03 (-.07)
.02 (.45)
.02 (.67)
.2 (1.02)
Population
.00 (1.09)
.00 (1.58)
-.00 (-.61)
.00 (1.63)
GDP
-.00 (-4.04)***
-1.5 (-.61)
-2.2 (-1.2)
-.00 (-4.52)***
Polity
-.01 (-.37)
.00 (1.57)
-.00 (-.61)
-.01 (-.87)
Cons
.3 (.93)
.12 (2.64)***
.05 (2.29)**
.17 (1.17)
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
Internet
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons

916 (87)
46.73
.00
.07

916 (87)
9.11
.17
.10

916 (87)
16.47
.01
.09

916 (87)
45.60
.00
.04

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (1.16)
-.05 (-.76)
.02 (.32)
-.00 (-.69)
-7.33 (-1.92)*
-.00 (-.24)
.17 (4.0)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-2.35)**
-.02 (-.31)
.06 (1.08)
-4.52 (-.06)
-1.58 (-.93)
-.00 (-.15)
.28 (8.01)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.82)
-.02 (-.25)
.02 (.45)
-.00 (-.41)
5.31 (1.28)
.01 (2.15)**
.18 (5.34)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (1.04)
-.04 (-.45)
-.06 (-1.14)
-.00 (-.50)
-4.1 (-2.42)**
.00 (.91)
.2 (4.39)***

N
916 (87)
916 (87)
916 (87)
916 (87)
Wald χ2
5.76
20.45
6.42
17.86
Prob>χ2
.45
.00
.38
.01
R2
.
.12
.11
.05
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
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Table 3.8 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability Types, Cell-Phones and
Press Freedoms in Non-Democracies
Anti-Gov
General Strikes
Purges
Riots
Demonstrations
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Cell-phone
.02 (5.41)***
.00 (.03)
.00 (4.53)***
.01 (4.27)***
Full Free Press
-.2 (-.42)
-.11 (-2.2)**
.01 (.38)
-.01 (-.07)
Part Free Press
.04 (.10)
-.00 (-.12)
.02 (.56)
.09 (.50)
Population
.00 (1.39)
.00 (1.89)*
-.00 (-.26)
.00 (2.12)**
GDP
-.00 (-5.47)***
-1.57 (-.07)
-2.24 (-1.32)
-.00 (-4.12)***
Polity
-.02 (-.70)
.01 (1.84)*
-.00 (-.77)
-.01 (-.81)
Cons
.21 (.70)
.12 (3.09)***
.03 (1.36)
.12 (.76)
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

Variables
Cell-phone
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Polity
Cons
N
Wald χ2
Prob>χ2
R2

1062 (87)
52.02
.00
.04

1062 (87)
11.41
.08
.08

1062 (87)
24.32
.00
.10

1062 (87)
49.32
.00
.03

Guerrilla Warfare
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (1.70)*
-.04 (-.66)
.00 (.05)
-.00 (-.48)
-7.98 (-2.42)**
-.00 (-.44)
.15 (4.1)***

Revolutions
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-1.19)
-.08 (-.93)
.03 (.46)
.00 (.18)
-4.78 (-3.04)***
.00 (.05)
.31 (6.84)***

Major Gov Crisis
1990-2012
b (z)
-.00 (-.58)
-.01 (-.19)
.04 (1.22)
.00 (1.01)
1.08 (.49)
.01 (2.11)**
.16 (5.36)***

Assassinations
1990-2012
b (z)
.00 (.97)
-.13 (-1.83)*
-.07 (-1.44)
7.59 (.26)
-4.56 (-2.30)**
.00 (1.37)
.18 (4.49)***

1062 (87)
11.01
.08
.0009

1062 (87)
36.44
.00
.07

1062 (87)
9.49
.14
.09

1062 (87)
8.88
.18
.04

Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
In Table 3.7, I displayed the coefficients for the models that included the Internet variable. These results
were similar to the new ICTs variable models. The Internet variable coefficients were statistically significant and
positive in the models for anti-government demonstrations (b= .10, z= 6.14), purges (b=.00, z=3.36), riots (b=.03 ,
z=5.02). The Internet coefficient in the revolutions (b= -.00, z= -2.28) model was significant and negative. These
results suggest that higher levels of Internet penetration rates in a country were positively related to instances of
anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, purges, riots, guerrilla warfare, and negatively related to
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revolutions. None of the freedom of the press variable coefficients were statistically significant in the models that
included the Internet variable.
In Table 3.8, I displayed the results for the models that included the cell-phone variable coefficients. The
results of these analyses were similar to the new ICTs and Internet variable models with the addition of the guerrilla
warfare model variable coefficient becoming statistically significant. The cell-phone variable coefficient was
positive and statistically significant in the models for anti-government demonstrations (b=.02 , z= 5.41), purges
(b=.00 , z=4.53), riots (b=.00, z=4.27), and guerrilla warfare (b=.00 , z=1.70).
The results indicated that higher levels of cell phone penetration rates in a country are positively related to instances
of anti-government demonstrations, purges, riots, guerrilla warfare. The media freedoms variable coefficients failed
to reach statistical significance in several models but it was it was significant in the political assassinations (b= -.13,
z= -1.83) and general strikes (b= -.11, z= -2.2) models. This suggests that political assassinations and general strikes
are less likely in countries that have full free press freedom press ratings compared to not free press ratings.
Sociopolitical Instability in Highly Unstable Non-democracies
Part of media systems dependency theory postulates that media dependency increases when sociopolitical
instability is high (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). To further test the hypotheses, I analyzed the relationship
between new ICTs and sociopolitical instability in non-democracies that experienced high levels of sociopolitical
instability. Following Groshek (2011), I deemed countries as having “high” levels of sociopolitical instability if they
had greater than average rating (mean= 883.18) on the Bank’s weighted conflict index. I displayed the results in
Table 3.9.
In Model 3, I reported the coefficients for the model that included the new ICT (b=658.7, z=2.19) variable
coefficient, which was statistically significant and positive. The Internet (b=76.5, z=3.20) variable coefficient was
also statistically significant and in the expected direction, in Model 1. These findings indicate that in countries with
high levels of sociopolitical instability, new ICTs were good predictors of more instances of sociopolitical
instability. In Model 1, the part free press (b=709, z=2.49) variable coefficient was statistically significant and
positive, suggesting that going from a not free press rating to a partially free press rating increased the probabilities
of a country having experienced sociopolitical instability. In Model 3, the full free press (b= -653, z= -1.88) variable
coefficient was negative and statistically significant, indicating that going from a not free press rating to a full free
press rating was negatively correlated to higher sociopolitical instability ratings. Several control variable coefficients
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Table 3.9 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Sociopolitical Instability, New ICTs and Press
Freedoms in Highly Unstable Non-Democracies
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Internet
76.5 (3.20)***
Cell Phone
7.6 (1.56)
New ICTs
658.7 (2.19)**
Full Free Press
439.5 (.76)
-704 (-2.01)**
-653 (-1.88)*
Part Free Press
709 (2.49)**
320 (1.27)
339 (1.38)
Polity
33.9 (1.34)
57.1 (2.16)**
56.24 (2.22)**
Population
-.50 (-1.11)
.05 (.10)
-.04 (-.10)
GDP
-.10 (-2.35)**
-.02 (-.59)
-.03 (-1.14)
Cons
2726 (21.28)***
2908 (17.16)***
3360 (15.74)***
N
Wald chi2
Prob>chi2
R2

397 (82)
22.47
.000
.32

529 (90)
24.11
.000
.28

530 (90)
26.16
.000
.28

Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
achieved consistent statistical significance across models. The polity variable coefficient was statistically significant
and positive. This finding indicates that in countries that are not full democracies, sociopolitical instability is more
likely in countries that are more democratic than autocratic. The GDP variable coefficient was statistically
significant and negative in the majority of models, signifying that increased GDP was negatively associated with
instances of sociopolitical instability. In the next section, I discussed the results, limitation and implications of the
research in this chapter.
Discussion
In this chapter, I empirically analyzed whether media and new ICT systems and press freedoms were
related to sociopolitical instability in countries. Although the hypotheses were not universally supported, several
were fully or partially supported. As this was a macro-level study, it had limitations such as not being able to
strongly claim that each individual occurrence of sociopolitical instability were assisted by new ICTs. Nevertheless,
the statistical analyses provided evidence of positive and negative impacts of developed media systems and
freedoms on occurrences of sociopolitical instability across all countries, in non-democracies, and in countries that
experienced sociopolitical instability. Moreover, several of the models in which I analyzed the instability types

37

produced intriguing findings. These are important findings to the collective action and regime censorship/
surveillance, conflict, and freedom of expression research.
Although the hypotheses were not fully supported in the models that included the sociopolitical index,
there was evidence of support for them in the models that explored the research question regarding the individual
sociopolitical types. One of the main debates taking place among new media scholars is whether new ICTs and
social media actually help dissenters organize, or help governments with censorship and surveillance.
In both the sections (all countries & non-democracies only), the new ICT, Internet, and cell-phone variable
coefficients were positive and statistically significantly related to several individual sociopolitical types. Perhaps the
most interesting findings were the consistent positive correlations between the new ICTs, Internet and cell-phones
variable coefficients and increased occurrences of anti-government demonstrations and purges. The anti-government
demonstrations indicator is exactly that, organized and visible opposition to the government. The purges indicator
tracked instance of the government cracking down on political opposition. These results add insight into the debate
regarding whether dissenters use new ICTs to organize opposition or if the governments use them to track and
censor opposition (Howard & Hussain, 2013; Morozov, 2011; Shirky, 2009). The results here indicated that both
sides of the argument deserve credit. New ICTs were related to higher instances of anti-government organization
and instances of government crackdowns. That is, new ICT penetration rates in countries were related to antigovernment collective action as well as government repression of political opposition. These findings make intuitive
sense but needed empirical evidence. In this study, I scratched the surface of these debates. Nevertheless, the results
should be interpreted with care, as in many of the models the only significant coefficients were those of the new ICT
variables, suggesting that the models were not great fits and other control variables are likely needed.
I found strong support for the hypotheses regarding increased levels of press freedoms and lack of
instability. Countries with full freedom of the press ratings were much less likely to experience sociopolitical
instability. Freer and more developed media and ICT systems assist peaceful political change. This is partially due
to the public sphere enriching accessibility of information (Habermas, 1996). A free press contributes to the
accountability of the government. Through exposition of corruption, following up on campaign promises, and
reporting on policy performance, a free press holds an important role in democratic progress (Gurevitch &
Blummler; Schudson, 1995; Voltmer, 2006). According to freedom of expression theories, freed speech allows
people to air their grievances, and works as a pressure release valve that assists in keeping people from desiring and
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engaging in violent uprisings (Mill 1859, 2010). These findings are consistent with other political risk and press
freedom studies (Roy, 2014).
In both sections (all countries & non-democracies only), the models that included the sociopolitical index
uncovered mixed results. In the models that included the Internet and cell-phone covariates, the Internet variable
coefficients were positively related to sociopolitical instability and the cell-phone variable coefficients were
negatively related. These findings are intriguing and should be further researched. At first glance, one could argue
that higher rates of cell-phone diffusion are indicative of democratic development, but in those models, the polity
variable coefficients were positive, indicating that higher levels of democracy were related to more instances of
sociopolitical disruption. Increased levels of Internet and democracy were positively related to higher probabilities
of sociopolitical instability, while increased cell-phone and GDP rates were indicative of lack of instability. The
Internet variable coefficients were strongly and consistently related to increased occurrences of sociopolitical
instability. These findings strongly supported the hypothesis consistent with the expectations of the collective action
and new ICT literature (see Garrett, 2006). New ICTs contribute to helping dissenters communicate and spread
information ((Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber et al., 2012).
The strongest results were in the non-democratic countries. The main takeaway is that new ICT penetration
rates related to sociopolitical instability in non-democratic countries over the last two decades. The consistent
negative statistical significance of the full free press variable coefficients are intriguing. These findings imply that in
countries that are non-democracies with low press freedom ratings, but with high new ICT diffusion, experienced
sociopolitical instability. Again, these findings add credibility to the government surveillance circumvention
capabilities of new ICT users.
There was evidence that new ICTs penetration rates were higher in countries that experienced sociopolitical
instability. The sociopolitical index included various types of instability, both violent and nonviolent methods.
Analyzing the different types of sociopolitical instability showed that new ICTs were related to violent and
nonviolent means. Comparing instances of major nonviolent and violent conflicts and the media systems
characteristics in those counties in which the conflicts occurred could provide valuable insight. In the next section, I
present the results for the analyses in which I compared instances of major violent and nonviolent conflict in
countries and media systems characteristics in those countries.
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CHAPTER 4
NONVIOLENT/VIOLENT CONFLICT AND MEDIA/ICTS
Results
Table 4.1 depicts the results from the logistic regression analyses in which nonviolent/violent campaign
(nonviolent=1, violent=0) was the dependent variable. The effects of the variables interpret as a log-odds ratio,
meaning that a one-unit change in the independent variable (X) is a b-unit change in the log-odds ratio of the
dependent variable (Y). The individual variables interpret as holding all other variables in the model constant. The
table also displays the LR χ2, Prob>χ2, the Pseudo R2, and the percentage of cases that the model correctly
classified. Table 4.1 displays the results of the analyses in which I tested H5-H7.
H5: Higher levels of media (tv, newspapers, radio) diffusion positively correlate with nonviolent resistance
campaigns
The media/ICT variable coefficients were statistically significant and in the expected direction in all of the
models displayed in Table 4.1. In the first two models, I reported the coefficients for the traditional media variables,
which did not include the freedom of the press variables. The first model demonstrated that the newspaper (b=.00,
z=2.56), radio (b=.00, z=4.05), and TV (b=.00, z=3.86) variable coefficients were statistically significant and
positive. This was also the case in the second model, which included the old media (b=2.42, z=10.25) variable
coefficient.
I estimated the changes in probabilities for Model 1 as well. The min-max coefficient for the old media
variable =.93, meaning that moving from the lowest level of old media penetration to the highest level of old media
penetration increased the likelihood of the campaign being nonviolent rather than violent by .93. The old media
variable marginal effects coefficient = .33, indicating that a one-unit change at the mean of the oldmedia variable
coefficient resulted in a .33 increase in the probability of a campaign being nonviolent instead of violent, holding all
other variables at their means (Model 2). These results strongly support the hypothesis regarding the positive
relationship between traditional media indicators and nonviolent conflict.
In Model 3, I reported the coefficients for the traditional media variable coefficients: newspaper (b=.01,
z=3.57), radio (b=.00, z=2.87), TV (b=.01, z=2.78). Due to the inclusion of the freedom of the press variables in
Models 3 & 4, these models included observations for the years 1980-2003. In Model 3, all three of the traditional
media variable coefficients were statistically significant and positive. In general, the coefficients from the first four
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models provide strong evidence that when comparing instances of major nonviolent or violent conflict, countries
with higher levels of media diffusion were more likely to experience nonviolent conflict than violent conflict.
H6a: Higher levels of new ICTs in a country positively correlate with nonviolent resistance campaigns
compared to violent resistance campaigns
Models 6-12 display the coefficients for models testing the relationship between nonviolent/violent conflict
and new ICTs and press freedoms. These models included observations from 1990-2006 with Models 10-12 ranging
from 2000-2006. In Model 6, the new ICT (b=1.7, z=2.71) variable coefficient was statistically significant in the
Table 4.1 Logistic Regression Estimates of Nonviolent/Violent Conflict and Media, New ICTs and Press Freedoms
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
1946-2003
1946-2003
1980-2003
1980-2003
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Newspaper
.00 (2.56)**
.01 (3.57)***
Radio
.00 (4.05)***
.00 (2.87)***
TV
.00 (3.86)***
.01 (2.78)***
Internet
Cell Phone
Media
Old Media
2.42 (10.25)***
2.98 (8.19)***
New ICTs
Full Free Press
-----.74 (-1.18)
-.7 (-1.11)
Part Free Press
----.91 (3.26)***
.93 (3.33)***
Polity
-.08 (-5.10)***
-.08 (-5.21)***
-.09 (-3.86)***
-.10 (-3.93)***
Population
7.44 (1.42)
6.89 (1.32)
-9.2 (-.12)
-5.74 (-.08)
GDP
-.00 (-3.75)***
-.00 (-3.80)***
-2.89 (-9.91)
-.00 (-2.80)***
Intercept -2.60(-15.63)***
-.69 (-4.90)***
N
984
984
612
612
LR χ2
172.62
168.73
124.13
123.62
Prob>χ2
.000
.000
.000
.000
Pseudo R2
.177
.173
.194
.193
Correctly Classified
84.45%
83.94%

Variables
Media
Internet
Cell Phone
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Polity
Population
GDP
Cons
N

(5)
1980-2006
b (z)
2.18 (6.76)***

1.72 (4.76)***
1.22 (4.76)***
-.08 (-3.71)***
-.00 (-3.12)***
-.00 (-4.61)***
-.43 (-1.85)**
702

(6)
1990-2006
b (z)

1.7 (2.74)***
2.3 (4.46)***
1.5 (4.50)***
-.03 (-1.05)
-.00 (-4.49)***
-.00 (-4.03)***
.11 (.21)
423
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(7)
1990-2006
b (z)

(8)
1990-2006
b (z)

.16 (2.35)**
-.02 (-1.02)

.10 (2.77)***

2.2 (3.45)***
1.5 (3.58)***
-.02 (-.63)
-.00 (-4.08)***
-.00 (-3.54)***
-.95 (-3.05)***
284

2.3 (3.59)***
1.6 (3.62)***
-.02 (-.76)
-.00 (4.13)***
-.00 (-3.61)***
-.99 (-3.20)***
285

(Table 4.1 continued)
Variables
LR χ2
Prob>χ2
Pseudo R2
Correctly Classified

(5)
1980-2006
b (z)
92.20
.000
.118

Variables

(6)
1990-2006
b (z)
62.74
.000
.132

(9)
1990-2006
b (z)

(10)
2000-2006
b (z)

New ICTs
Full Free
Press
Part Free
Press
Polity

(12)
2000-2006
b (z)

.32
(2.53)***
-.04 (1.27)

.21
(2.72)***

.03 (.46)
-.01 (3.48)***
-.00 (2.70)***

2.4
(2.25)**
1.13
(1.70)*
.05 (.88)
-.01 (3.38)***
-.00 (3.21)***

2.6
(2.50)**
1.16
(1.75)*
.03 (.61)
-.01 (3.46)***
-.00 (3.32)***

Population
GDP
Cons

1.1 (1.30)

-.26 (-.57)

-.4 (-.78)

115
32.28
.000
.23

114
40.32
.000
.29

114
38.42
.000
.28

.02
(2.22)**
2.23
(4.38)***
1.43
(4.43)***
-.03 (-1.08)
-.00 (4.43)***
-.00 (3.85)***
-1.12 (4.49)***
422
60.11
.000
.13

(8)
1990-2006
b (z)
48.03
.000
.150

(11)
2000-2006
b (z)

Internet
Cell Phone

(7)
1990-2006
b (z)
49.17
.000
.154

1.97 (1.75)*
2.45
(2.48)**
1.12 (1.74)*

N
LR χ2
Prob>χ2
Pseudo R2
Correctly
Classified
Note: ***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10

expected direction. The changes in probabilities min/max coefficient for the new ICT variable = .77, signifying that
moving from the lowest level of new ICT penetration rate to the highest level of new ICT penetration rate increased
the probabilities of a campaign being nonviolent by .77. The marginal effects coefficient for the new ICT variable =
.27, indicating that a one-unit change at the mean of the new ICT variable coefficient results in a .27 increase in the
likelihood of the conflict being nonviolent compared to violent, holding all other variables at their mean.
Looking at the models that included the years 2000-2010, the positive relationship between new ICT
penetration and nonviolent conflict holds. In Model 10, the new ICT (b=1.97, z=1.75) variable coefficient remained
statically significant and positive. The changes in probabilities min/max coefficient for the new ICT variable = .83,
signifying that moving from the lowest level of new ICT penetration rate to the highest level of new ICT penetration
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rate increased the probabilities of a campaign being nonviolent by .83. The marginal effects coefficient for the new
ICT variable = .30, indicating that a one-unit change at the mean of the new ICT variable coefficient results in a .30
increase in the likelihood of the conflict being nonviolent compared to violent, holding all other variables at their
mean.
H6b: Higher levels of Internet penetration rate in a country positively correlate with nonviolent resistance
campaigns compared to violent resistance campaigns
In Models 8, the Internet (b=.10, z=2.82) variable coefficient was statistically significant and in the
expected direction, supporting the hypothesis. Looking at the year, the Internet (b=.21, z=2.72) variable coefficient
was statistically significant in the expected direction (Model 12) In other words, increased levels of ICTs and were
strong predictors of nonviolent conflict compared to violent conflict.
H6c: Higher levels of cellular-phone penetration rate in a country positively correlate with nonviolent
resistance campaigns compared to violent resistance campaigns
In Model 9, the cell-phone (b=.02, z=2.23) variable coefficients was positive and statistically significant,
supporting the hypothesis. The cell-phone variable coefficient did not achieve statistical significance when analyzed
independently from the years 2000-2006 (not shown).
H7: Higher levels of media freedoms in a country relate to nonviolent resistance compared to violent
resistance campaigns
Both of the press freedoms variable coefficients were statistically significant in the majority of the models,
offering strong support for the hypothesis. The models that included the new ICT variables most strongly supported
the hypothesis. For instance, in Model 6, full free press (b=2.3, z=4.52), and part free press (b=1.5, z=4.63) variable
coefficients were statistically significant and in the expected direction. In Models 8 and 9, both of the freedom of the
press rating variable coefficients were highly statistically significant in relation to nonviolent conflict. This was also
the case in Model 10, as the full free press (b=2.45, z=2.48) and part free press (b=1.12, z=1.74) variable
coefficients were positively statistically significant. In the models that included the traditional media variables, the
hypothesis was only partially supported. In Model 3, the full free (b= -.74, z= -1.18) variable coefficient was not
statistically significant, but the part free press (b=.91, z=3.26) variable coefficient was, indicating that going from a
no free press to a part free press rating increased the probabilities of a conflict being nonviolent.
Many of the control variable coefficients were statistically significant across the models. In the analyses
that included the years 1946-2003 (Models 1 & 2), the polity variable coefficients were statistically significant and
negative, suggesting that compared to nonviolent conflicts, violent conflicts were more likely in countries with
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higher levels of democracy. This relationship faded in the analyses that included the years 1990/2000-2010,
indicating that in the models that included the more recent years, regime type did not impact the conflict type. The
GDP variable coefficients were consistently statistically significant and negative, as was the case with the
population variable coefficients but not across all models. These findings signify that countries with higher levels of
GDP and population are more likely to experience violent conflict than nonviolent conflict.
Discussion
In this section, I empirically analyzed whether new ICTs, traditional media and press freedoms were
predictors of nonviolent conflict rather than violent conflict. Like most macro-level studies, this study had its
limitations such as not being able to strongly infer at the level of each individual campaign the ways and magnitude
that new ICTs were used and the absence of all-encompassing national variables. Nevertheless, the results of the
hypotheses tests were strongly supported. The statistical analyses produced solid evidence that increased levels of
new ICTs, traditional media indicators, and media freedoms highly correlated with countries that experienced major
nonviolent resistance campaigns compared to countries that experienced violent campaigns. These are important
findings for the relatively new research stream of comparing the aggregate correlates of nonviolent and violent
conflicts.
Higher levels of new ICT (Internet and/or cell-phone) diffusion in a country strongly predicted the
likelihood of the conflict being nonviolent. The new ICT (combined variable of Internet & cell-phone), the Internet,
and the cell-phone variable coefficients were all statistically significant in the models that covered the years 19902006. And for the years 2000-2006, the new ICT and Internet variable coefficients were statistically significant.
These findings supported the hypotheses and are consistent with the expectations of the collective action and new
ICT literature (see Garrett, 2006). The participation barriers are much lower for nonviolent conflict than for violent
conflict. New ICTs contribute to further lowering the participation costs of nonviolent conflict by helping organizers
and dissenters communicate, spread information, and share grievances (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber et al.,
2012). These factors would help the nonviolent campaign gain and maintain supporters, which contributes to the
impact that the campaign has in influencing the controlling regime or foreign power.
The results supported the theoretical propositions of the dictator’s dilemma set forth by Kendzie and
Aragon (2002). Although the polity score variable coefficients were not significant here, Chenoweth & Lewis
(2013) found evidence that nonviolent campaigns took place in stronger authoritarian countries than violent
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campaigns. Higher levels of new ICTs being more related to nonviolent conflict than violent conflict implies, at least
in part, that nonviolent conflicts commonly occurred in nondemocratic countries with higher levels of new ICTs.
This is important because nonviolent campaigns were more likely to meet their campaign objectives than violent
conflict, and lead to higher rates of observable democracy.
Greater levels of traditional media indicators (tv, newspapers, radio) in a country that experienced a major
conflict were highly statistically related to nonviolent conflict rather than violent conflict. This relationship held in
both the models that included the variables separately (tv, newspapers, radio) and together as a single variable (old
media). These results supported the hypothesis and brought needed insight into the relationship between traditional
media systems and conflict types. Although much of the literature and theory link the importance of new ICTs to
nonviolent conflict, traditional media indicators are often (recently) left out of the discussion, and to my knowledge,
this is the first time these macro-level relationships have been shown. These results are supported by the MSD
propositions that the probability of media dependency increases when media supply higher numbers of information
utilities, which amplifies individual and societal effects, or when there are greater levels of sociopolitical instability
(DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). These findings may be linked to freedom of expression. Unfortunately, the
freedom of the press indicators only go back to 1980, where these data begin in 1943. In the limited year models that
included the press freedom variables (1980-2003), there was evidence that going form no press freedoms to partial
press freedoms increased the likelihood of a campaign being nonviolent compared to violent.
Higher levels of media freedoms were also strong predictors of nonviolent conflict compared to violent
conflict, which supported freedom of expression and democratic theories. Enhanced media freedoms, which serve
as a reasonable proxy for societal freedom of expression overall, allow for the likelihood of the controlling
government to be questioned, corruption exposed and discussed, and differing policy goals considered. In addition,
in the instance of an emerging popular protest challenging the government, a freer media system would allow of the
coverage of that protest and for the amplification of dissenting voices, enhancing the chances that the protest would
grow in size and strength. This would also serve the purposes of an armed conflict, but the participation costs of a
nonviolent conflict are much lower than for violent conflict. In other words, due to not needing weaponry or asking
people to use violence against others, the moral and financial obligations are much lower for participating in a
nonviolent campaign than a violent campaign. At the societal level, the findings here suggest substantial media
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effects. I am not intending, however, to make a technological determinist argument. I support the “technology is
neutral” line of thinking (Livingston, 2011; Rosenau & Johnson, 2002).
New ICTs are neither inherently “good” nor “bad.” The simple existence of enhanced communication tools
in a society does not guarantee that individuals will use these outlets to deliberate, educate, and organize. Like past
technologies such as the printing press, the telegraph, the telephone, radio, and television, the technologies are what
those who produce and use them make them out to be. Arguing the positive and negative implications of
communication technologies is asking to argue the characteristics of human nature. A dictator would much prefer
their citizens to use new ICTs and media to consume popular culture and remain distracted; nevertheless, when
motivated, individuals can use these technologies to acquire and produce information and communicate with each
other to regarding sociopolitical grievances enhancing the probabilities of collective action.
In modern day conflicts, it is likely that both armed rebels and protesters use new ICTs to assist their
causes. The Syrian civil war born from the Arab Spring could be the most digitally mediated civil war in history.
Many sides of the Syrian conflict use/d cell-phones to communicate and can be found on YouTube and other social
media stating their cases. Certainly, cell-phones are valuable sources for communicating among rebels. As found
here, however, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect higher levels of new ICTs and press freedoms to be
more prevalent in countries that experienced nonviolent conflicts versus violent.
This study bridges a gap between communication and conflict scholars. The civil wars research in political
science commonly omits media and new ICT variables, in no small part due to the lack of theoretical overlap and
complete cross-national data sets. This analysis can assist in bringing new ICTs and press freedom variables into
consideration for conflict scholars. Additionally, in the models here, the new ICT and media freedoms variables
were stronger predictors of nonviolent conflict than the correlates of population (violent conflict) and authoritarian
strength (nonviolent) found by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). Not to imply that polity type, population, and
economic factors are not important, but including new ICTs and media freedoms as principle components of
understanding conflict typology provides greater understanding of the complex sociopolitical environments in which
nonviolent and violent conflict evolve and resolve.
Researchers should continue to piece together characteristics that distinguish nonviolent and violent
conflict. This study is limited due to missing data and the aggregate-level of the data, as such, future comparative
case studies between nonviolent and violent conflicts and new ICTs and media freedoms are needed. This
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knowledge also has important implications for future policies, democracy advocacy, and the well being of societies
in general. Much of the research cited here indicates that compared to violent conflict, nonviolent conflict has
increased in frequency in the past few decades, has been more successful in ousting authoritarian regimes or foreign
occupying powers, and is more likely to produce transitions towards democracy. The perpetuation of this knowledge
could encourage nonviolent resistance and lower the occurrences of civil wars, all of which could be assisted with
increased levels of new ICTs and media freedoms.
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CHAPTER 5
DEMOCRACY-AUTOCRACY AND NEW ICTS, MEDIA, & PRESS FREEDOMS
Results
Table 5.1 shows the results for various models in which I tested the hypotheses regarding new ICTs,
traditional media, and press freedoms in relation to institutionalized democracy across all countries. Across all
twelve models, I found strong support for the positive and statistically significant relation between democracy levels
and media/ICT penetration rates.
H8a: Higher rates of new ICTs positively correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
In Model 1, the new ICT (b=1.2, z=9.53) variable coefficient was positive and statistically significant. The
coefficient can be interpreted as one unit increase in new ICT levels in countries results in a 1.2 unit change moving
toward democracy on the Polity 2 scale. In Model 4, the new ICT (b=.66, z=4.77) variable coefficients was highly
statistically significant and in the expected direction. This suggests that in the last two decades, diffusion of new
ICTs were highly associated with higher levels of institutionalized democracy across countries, supporting the
hypothesis.
H8b: Higher rates of Internet penetration rates in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels.
In Model 2, the Internet (b=.04, z=7.26) variable coefficient was positive and highly statistically
significant. In Model 6, I displayed the results from the analysis covering the years 2000-2012. Again, the Internet
(b=.03, z=5.44) variable coefficient was highly statistically significant in the expected direction. I found strong
support for the hypothesis in these two models.
H8c: Higher rates of cellular-phone penetration rate in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels
In Model 3, the cell-phone (b=.02, z= 9.12) variable coefficient was positive and highly statistically
significant. In Model 5, for the years covering the years 2000-2012, the cell-phone (b=.01, z=3.92) variable
coefficient was again positive and highly significant. The results of these analyses strongly support the hypothesis.
H9: Higher levels of traditional media penetration rate in a country positively correlate to institutionalized
democratic levels
The newspaper (b=.00, z=2.63), radio (b=.00, z=4.19), and TV (b=.00, z=6.83) variable coefficients were
highly statistically significant in Model 7. In Model 8, the old media (b=3.2, z=12.25) variable coefficient was
positive and highly statistically significant, offering strong support for the hypothesis.
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Table 5.1 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Institutionalized Democracy/Autocracy, New ICTs,
Media, and Press Freedoms across Countries

Variables

(1)
1990-2012
b (z)

(2)
1990-2012
b (z)
.04 (7.26)***

(3)
1990-2012
b (z)

(4)
2000-2012
b (z)

Internet
Cell Phone
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press

1.2 (9.53)***
5.9(26.26)***
3.4 (18.43)***

6.25 (22.51)***
3.8 (16.06)***

Population

-.00 (-5.04)***

-.00 (-6.50)***

GDP
Cons
N
Wald chi2
Prob>chi2
R2

.00 (4.31)***
.81 (3.86)***
3584 (159)
1051.81
.000
.38

.00 (1.99)**
-.12 (-.50)
2959 (158)
816.89
.000
.33

.00 (6.20)***
.02 (.10)
3578 (159)
11.02.44
.000
.41

.00 (3.29)***
1.8 (6.34)***

Variables

(5)
2000-2012
b (z)

(6)
2000-2012
b (z)

(7)
1980-2003
b (z)
.00 (2.63)***
.00 (4.19)***
.00 (6.83)***

(8)
1980-2003
b (z)

Newspaper
Radio
TV
Old Media
Internet
Cell Phone
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Cons

.02 (9.12)***
5.9 (26.64)***
3.34 (18.23)***
-.0(-4.96)***

.66 (4.77)***
4.7 (15.67)***
2.9 (10.62)***
-.00 (.27)

1992 (157)
511.03
.000

3.2 (12.25)***
.03 (5.44)***
.01 (3.92)***
4.9 (15.39)***
3.0 (10.78)***
.00 (1.49)
.00 (3.73)***
1.1 (3.56)***

5.1 (16.03)***
2.9 (10.89)***
-.00 (-1.96)**
.00 (3.93)***
1.5 (5.42)***

5.2 (16.08)***
3.1 (14.07)***
3.70 (.89)
-.00 (-1.10)
-3.6(-10.16)***

5.2 (16.01)***
3.1 (14.04)***
4.85 (1.2)
-7.72 (-.47)
-1.2 (-4.0)***

N
1987 (157)
1955 (157)
2735 (120)
2735 (120)
Wald chi2
434.1
806.08
855
772.5
Prob>chi2
.000
.000
.000
.000
R2
.47
.51
.30
.29
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
H10: Higher levels of media freedoms in a country positively correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
Across all eight models both of the press freedoms rating variable coefficients were statistically significant
and positive. These findings strongly support the hypothesis. For Models 7 and 8, I included the traditional media
variables and the press freedom variables, which ranged from years 1980-2003. In both models, the media and press
freedom variable coefficients were statistically significant and in the expected direction.
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In Model 1, both of the press freedom variable coefficients were statistically significant and positive across
the models. That is, going from a no press freedoms rating to a free press rating, and a no press freedoms rating to a
partially free press rating predicted higher levels of democracy. Again looking at Model 1, the full free press (b=5.9,
z=26.26) variable coefficient suggests that going from a not free press rating to a free press rating in countries
increased the Polity 2 score by 5.9 towards democracy (on a 21-point scale). In Model 7, which included the
traditional media variables, the full free press (b=5.2, z=16.08) and part free press (b=3.1, z=14.07) variable
coefficients were highly statistically significant.
Looking at the control variables, for the most part the population variable coefficients were in the negative
direction, indicating that higher in country population per capita was more associated with lower levels of
democratic governance. The GDP variable coefficients were positive, which suggests that increased levels of GDP
correlated with increased levels of democracy in countries. In the next section, I analyzed these same relationships in
non-democratic countries.
Democracy-Autocracy and Media/ICTs in Non Full-Democracies
To test the relationship between media/ICTs and democracy in countries that are not full-democracies, I
included all countries in the data that contained a Polity score of 6 or less (Celestino & Gleditsch 2013; Gleditsch &
Ward, 2006).
Table 5.2 shows the results for various models in which I tested hypotheses H11a-c and H12. In the
majority of the models, I found strong support for the positive and statistically significant relationship between
democracy levels and media/ICT penetration rates in countries that are not full-democracies.
H11a: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of new ICTs penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
The new ICT (b=.56, z=2.37) was statistically significant and in the expected direction (Model 1). This
strongly supports the hypothesis that new ICTs diffusion and increased press freedoms in a country predicted higher
democracy levels in those countries.
H11b: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of Internet penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
In Model 2, the Internet (b= -.03, z= -1.75) variable coefficient was statistically significant in the negative
direction. In Model 4, I reported the coefficients for model that included the years 2000-2012, and the Internet (b= -
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.03, z= -2.84) variable coefficient was highly statistically significant in the negative direction. Both of these findings
are opposite of the hypothesized direction, not offering support.
Table 5.2 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Institutionalized Democracy/Autocracy, New ICTs,
Media, and Press Freedoms in Non-Democracies

Variables
Internet
Cell Phone
New ICTs
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Cons
N
Wald chi2
Prob>chi2
R2

Variables
Newspaper
Radio
TV
Old Media
Full Free Press
Part Free Press
Population
GDP
Intercept

(1)
1990-2012
b (z)

(2)
1990-2012
b (z)
-.03 (-1.75)*
.02 (2.73)***

.00 (2.50)**

.56 (2.37)***
5.7 (14.2)***
2.2 (11.01)***
.00 (2.54)***
-.00 (-6.74)***
-1.6 (-4.37)***

4.9 (8.01)***
2.3 (8.82)***
.00 (3.04)***
-.00 (5.48)***
-.00 (-6.17)***

5.6 (13.74)***
2.1 (10.66)***
.00 (2.73)***
-.00 (-6.91)***
-1.5 (-5.91)***

4.7 (6.41)***
1.9 (6.0)***
.00 (1.67)***
-.00 (-4.89)***
-.71 (-1.97)**

1915 (111)
300.97
.000
.20

1500 (109)
156.4
.000
.14

1909 (111)
286.9
.000
.20

984 (92)
112.21
.000
.14

(5)
1980-2003
b (z)
-.00 (-.62)
.00 (4.67)***
.00 (1.00)

(6)
1980-2003
b (z)

4.2 (10.03)***
1.9 (9.59)***
-2.3(-1.32)
-.00 (-4.26)***
-5.3 (-17.76)***

(3)
1990-2012
b (z)

(4)
2000-2012
b (z)
-.03 (-2.84)***

2.65 (8.89)***
4.4 (10.72)***
1.9 (9.59)***
-2.53 (-1.17)
-.00 (-4.86)
-3.1(-11.19)***

N
1589(89)
1589 (89)
Wald chi2
211.28
343.67
Prob>chi2
.00
.000
R2
.28
.28
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
H11c: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of cell-phone penetration rates positively
correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
In Model 2, cell phone (b=.02, z=-.03) variable coefficient was positive and statistically significant. In
Model 3, the cell phone (b=.00, z=2.50) variable coefficient maintained its high statistical significance in the
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expected direction. This suggests that in non-democracies, increased levels of cell-phone penetration rates were
related to higher levels of institutionalized democracy, supporting the hypothesis. The cell-phone variable
coefficient was not statistically significant in the model that covered the years 2000-2012 (not shown).
H12: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of traditional media penetration rates in a
country positively correlate to institutionalized democratic levels
In Model 5, the radio (b=.00, z=4.67) variable coefficient was the only coefficient that was statistically
significant. Nevertheless, when these three variables are combined into the old media (b=2.65, z=8.89) variable, the
coefficient was again highly statistically significant and in the expected direction (Model 6). For every one-unit
increase in old media in a country, the democracy score increased by nearly three (b=2.65). These findings
supported the hypothesis.
H13: In countries that are not fully democratic, higher levels of media freedoms in a country are positively
correlated to institutionalized democratic levels
The press freedoms rating variable coefficients maintained statistical significance in the expected direction
across all models. In Model 1, the full free press (b=5.7, z=14.2) and part free press (b=2.2, z=11.01) variable
coefficients were statistically significant and in the expected direction. In Model 7, which contained the old media
variable, the coefficients for the full free press (b=4.4, z=10.72) and part free press (b=1.9, z=9.59) variables were
statistically significant. Moving from a not free press to a full free press rating resulted in a 4.4 unit increase in
institutionalized democracy, holding the other variable coefficients constant. These variable coefficients were highly
statistically significant and in the expected direction, supporting the hypothesis.
Looking at the control variables, the population variable coefficients were statistically significant and
positive, except in the traditional media models. In the models that included analyses of more recent years,
increased levels of population were associated with increased levels of democracy across countries. The GDP
variable coefficients were statistically significant and negative in the new ICT models, suggesting that higher GDP
was negatively related to increased levels of democracy in countries that were not full democracies.
In the next section, I further explored the proposition of MSD by analyzing the relationship between media
systems and democracy in countries that experienced sociopolitical instability.
Democracy and Media in Countries that Experienced Sociopolitical Instability
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain the coefficients for the models that I used to test the hypothesis regarding the
relationship between media diffusion and democracy in countries that experienced sociopolitical instability. I
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included in the analyses any country that registered a score of greater than zero of sociopolitical instability on the
Bank’s weighted conflict index, which was about half of the observations in the data.
H14: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, higher levels of new ICTs relate to higher levels
of institutionalized democracy
Several of the media/ICT variable coefficients were statistically significant and positive. In Models 1-3, I
analyzed the new ICT variables relationship with democracy in countries that experienced sociopolitical instability
from 1990-2012. The new ICT variable coefficients were consistently statistically significant in the expected
direction. In Model 1, the new ICT (b=1.2, z=4.96) variable coefficient was statistically significant and positive.
This relationship holds for Model 2 and Model 3 in which the Internet (b=.04, z=3.43) and cell-phone (b=.02,
z=4.82) variable coefficients were statistically significant. Models 5-8 included covariates for the models for the
years 2000-2012. The new ICT variable (b=1.2, z=3.39) coefficient (Model 6), the Internet (b=.02, z=1.75) variable
coefficient (Model 5), and the cell-phone (b=.05, z=3.83) variable coefficient (Model 7), were all statistically
significant and positive. These findings strongly support the hypothesis.
H15: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, higher levels of traditional media rates relate to
higher levels of institutionalized democracy
In Models 9 & 10 included the traditional media and press freedom variables, as such the years ranged from
1980-2012. In Model 10, the old media (b=3.21, z=7.84) variable coefficient was statistically significant and in the
expected direction. I analyzed the traditional media variables separately in Model 9, and the newspaper (b=.00,
z=3.07) and radio (b=.00, z=4.55) variable coefficients were statistically significant, but the TV (b=.00, z=1.13)
variable coefficient was not.
H16: In countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, press freedoms relate to higher levels of
institutionalized democracy
The full press freedom and part free press ratings coefficients were statistically significant in all of these
models. In Model 1, which included the new ICT variable, the full free press (b=8.3, z=21.65) and part free press
(b=4.9, z=15.65) variable coefficients were positive and statistically significant. In Model 7, contained the
traditional media variables, the full free press (b=7.1, z=13.84) and part free press (b=4.75, z=14.1) were again
statistically significant. These findings produced strong evidence for the positive correlation between increased
levels of new ICTs and press freedoms, and increased democracy in countries that experienced sociopolitical
instability.
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Table 5.3 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Institutionalized Democracy/Autocracy,
New ICTs, Media, and Press freedoms in Socio-Politically Unstable Countries
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1990-2012
2000-2012
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Internet
.04 (3.43)***
Cell Phone
.02 (4.82)***
New ICTs
1.2 (4.96)***
1.2 (3.39)***
Full Free Press
8.3 (21.65)***
8.0 (18.69)***
8.3 (21.99)***
7.2 (12.66)***
Part Free Press 4.9 (15.65)***
4.9 (13.56)***
4.9 (15.62)***
4.6 (10.06)***
Population
-.00 (-2.6)***
-.00 (-2.5)**
-.00 (-2.60)***
-.00 (-1.99)**
GDP
9.64 (.48)
.00 (.58)
.00 (1.35)
-1.5 (-.09)
Cons
-.31 (-1.07)
-1.1 (-3.55)***
-1.3 (-4.43)***
.4 (.99)
N
1575 (156)
1284 (152)
1574 (156)
796 (144)
Wald chi2
1040.64
771.53
1117.46
608.07
Prob>chi2
.000
.000
.000
.000
R2
.56
.49
.58
.62

Variables
Newspaper
Radio
TV
Old Media
Internet
Cell Phone

(5)
2000-2012
b (z)

(6)
2000-2012
b (z)

(7)
1980-2003
b (z)
.00 (3.07)***
.00 (4.55)***
.00 (1.13)

(8)
1980-2003
b (z)

3.21 (7.84)***
.05 (3.83)***
.02 (2.93)***

New ICTs
Full Free Press

6.9 (12.13)***

7.4 (13.85)***

6.9 (13.94)***

7.1 (13.84)***

Part Free Press
4.6 (10.29)***
4.7 (10.34)***
4.7 (14.04)***
4.75 (14.1)***
Population
-.00 (-2.16)**
-.00 (-1.94)**
-3.22 (-.06)
-7.87 (-.16)
GDP
-.00 (-.61)
.00 (1.64)*
-.00 (-2.28)**
-.00 (-2.14)***
Cons
.04 (.10)
-.47 (-1.16)
-4.9 (-11.48)***
-.2.2 (-6.02)***
N
782 (143)
796 (144)
1428 (119)
1428 (119)
Wald chi2
614.24
587.59
1208.47
1122.1
Prob>chi2
.000
.000
.000
.000
R2
.62
.62
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models assume a
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the first-order autoregressive
process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
Next, I looked at this relationship while considering only non-democracies. Table 5.4 displays the
coefficients for the models in which I analyzed the relationship between democracy and media/new ICTs in nondemocracies that experienced some sociopolitical instability.
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Table 5.4 Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Estimates of Institutionalized Democracy/ Autocracy,
New ICTs, Media, and Press Freedoms in Socio-Politically Unstable Non-Democracies
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables
1990-2012
1990-2012
1980-2003
b (z)
b (z)
b (z)
Old Media
2.2 (4.38)***
Internet
Cell Phone
.03 (3.36)***
New ICTs
1.5 (3.27)***
Full Free Press
6.9 (9.35)***
6.9 (9.34)***
4.4 (6.23)***
Part Free Press
3.3 (10.43)***
3.3 (10.46)***
2.7 (8.74)***
Population
.00 (4.91)***
.00 (5.20)***
-3.35 (-5.68)***
GDP
-.00 (-5.29)***
-.00 (-5.54)***
-.00 (-5.05)***
Cons
-1.1 (-2.98)***
02.2 (-7.87)***
-2.9 (-7.91)***
N
838 (107)
837 (107)
803 (89)
Wald chi2
197.97
198.55
155.86
Prob>chi2
.000
.000
.000
R2
.29
.29
.37
Note: These models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). These models
assume a heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using estimates of the
first-order autoregressive process that are panel specific
***prob < 0.01, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.10
In Model 1 & 2, I reported the coefficients for models that included the new ICT variables. The new ICT
(b=1.5, z=3.27) variable coefficient (Model 1) was statistically significant and positive, as was the cell-phone
(b=.03, z=3.36) variable coefficient (Model 2). Both of the freedom of the press variable coefficients were
statistically significant and positive in both models. This provided evidence that in non-democracies that
experienced sociopolitical instability, diffusion of new ICTs and press freedom ratings were strong predictors of
increased levels of institutionalized democracy. This relationship held in Models 3, which included the old media
(b=2.2, z=4.38) variable coefficient.
Discussion & Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed whether new ICTs, traditional media, and media freedoms were predictors of
higher levels of institutionalized democracy. I also tested the propositions of media systems dependency theory by
analyzing the relationship of new ICTs and media freedoms in countries that experienced sociopolitical instability.
The results provided strong support for the hypotheses. The statistical analyses produced solid evidence that
increased levels of new ICTs and media freedoms strongly predicted increased levels of institutionalized democracy.
Also, more developed and freer media systems were related to increased levels of democracy in countries that were
not full-democracies.
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Higher levels of new ICT (Internet and/or mobile phone) penetration rates in a country strongly predicted
higher levels of institutionalized democracy. The new ICT (combined variable of Internet & cell-phone), the
Internet, and the cell-phone variable coefficients were all statistically significant in the models that covered the years
1990-2012 and 2000-2012. These findings supported the hypotheses and are consistent with the expectations of
democratic theory of the press and political communication research related to democracy and media systems
(Groshek, 2009, 2011; Weaver et al., 1985). Higher levels of new ICTs provide the potential of more avenues for
individuals to communicate with each other, receive more information outside of the traditional channels.
The results provided evidence of the democratic relationship with freedom of the press ratings. Regarding
democratic progress, media freedoms are the commonly considered among the most important institutional and
societal media systems component (Norris, 2000). These traits are important to democracies because of the necessity
for pluralistic policy debate, checking government power and abuses (watch-dog media), and educating and
ultimately engaging individuals in the political process (Norris, 2000).
Because it is possible that the well-established democracies, such as those typically associated with the
more economically developed countries of the West, could overly influence the results of the analyses, I analyzed
the non-democracies. Analyzing non-democracy can also provide additional insight into the possible emergence of
developing media systems and nation-states in transitions. In the majority of the models, higher levels of new ICT
penetration rates in a non-democratic country strongly related to higher levels of institutionalized democracy. This
was the case in the models for the years 1990-2012 that included the new ICT variable coefficients and mobile
phone. The Internet variable coefficient failed to achieve statistical significance in the 1990-2012 model, but was
negatively statistically significant in the model that included the years 2000-2012. This finding is in the opposite
direction of the hypothesis but provided an interesting result. This suggests that in non-democracies higher levels of
Internet penetration rates are stronger predictors of more autocratic than democratic governments, while mobile
phones were more related to democracy. This relationship can be seen in countries like Saudi Arabia, which is an oil
rich nation-state with high levels GDP and high levels of Internet penetration rates but exists within a strong
autocracy (Howard & Hussain, 2013). The propositions of the dictator’s dilemma come to mind in these types of
countries. These types of countries provide good case-study opportunities as the presence of new ICTs are high and
the potential of democracy remain unknown.
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In order to test the theoretical propositions of media systems dependency theory, that the probability of
media dependency increases when media supply higher numbers of information utilities, which amplifies individual
and societal effects, or when there are greater levels of sociopolitical instability, I analyzed the relationships of
media systems and democracy levels in countries that experienced sociopolitical instability. I found evidence that
supported the MSD propositions. Across all countries that experienced sociopolitical instability from 1990-2012,
higher levels of new ICTs were highly statistically related to higher levels of institutionalized democracy. The
Internet variable coefficient did not achieve statistical significance but the mobile phone and new ICTs variable
coefficients did. The models that included the traditional media variables, both with (1980-2003) and without (19462003) the press freedoms variables, supported the hypotheses and MSD propositions.
I found support for the MSD propositions in the models that included only the non-democracies that
experienced sociopolitical instability. In non-democratic countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, the
new ICTs variable coefficient and the mobile phone variable coefficient were statistically significant. In other
words, higher levels of new ICTs penetration rates were good predictors of higher levels of institutionalized
democracy in non-full democracies that experienced sociopolitical instability. The traditional media and media
variable coefficients were also statistically significant. MSD provided a good framework for contextualizing the
relationship among democracy and media systems. As more information outlets become available to individuals,
they will come to use and rely on these outlet more, increasing media dependency. Moreover, during times of
sociopolitical unrest, individuals will rely on media and new ICTs for information and possibly further contribute to
sociopolitical unrest, which possibly has a democratizing impact.
As the Internet variable coefficient was not statistically significant in the expected direction, or not at all,
there remains more to the story. The press freedoms variable coefficients were strongly and positively statistically
significantly related to democracy levels in most of the models. These findings highlight the importance of freedom
of expression throughout the democratic process. I found evidence in this study to support those who warn about the
power of censorship and surveillance. Censorship matters. One is hard pressed to imagine a functioning, stable
institutionalized democracy without a free press and developed IT infrastructure. It is even harder to imagine a
strong autocracy with a free and open press/web.
Developed and free communication environments are not only necessary in mature democratic systems but
are corner stones for transitional states attempting to break away from authoritarian control. Freer and more

57

developed media systems can assist with ushering in democratic reforms by performing watchdog functions, which
keep the public informed and could help prevent authoritarian relapses. Government legislation solidifying press and
Internet freedoms are key to sustained democratic transitions (Voltmer & Rownsley, 2009). This dynamic can be
perceived as a co-evolution between emerging democratic institutions while the press steadily liberalizes with
assurances from the government. As it remains difficult to decipher the directionality of the democracy-media
systems relationship, analyzing the democracy levels in regards to new ICT levels in a country provided insight into
the co-evolution of these dynamics. These findings are important to the long held theoretical assumptions of new
ICTs as democracy contributors and to the theories of freedom of expression.
In the next chapter, I provide overall conclusions of each of the previous chapters. I also discuss limitations
of each study and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Globally, there has been a recent uptick of occurrences of social unrest, much of which occurred in nondemocratic countries (Ortiz et al., 2013). My purpose here was to illuminate the media/new ICT characteristics in
the countries that experienced sociopolitical instability and if there were implications for democratic growth. I found
evidence that countries with higher rates of Internet and cell-phone penetration are more likely to experience
sociopolitical instability, are more likely to experience nonviolent conflict compared to violent conflict, and to have
higher levels of institutionalized democracy. I also found that higher levels of press freedoms were strong predictors
of sociopolitical stability, nonviolent conflict over violent conflict, and increased levels of institutionalized
democracy.
Sociopolitical Instability
One of the main debates taking place among new media scholars is whether new ICTs and social media
actually help dissenters organize and protest, or help governments to censor, survey, and shut-down dissenters
(Morozov, 2011; Morozov & Howard, 2011; Shirky, 2011). By analyzing the different types of sociopolitical
instability in these data, I found some evidence for the validity of both sides of the argument. Higher rates of new
ICTs, Internet, and cell-phones in a country were good predictors of both dissenter activities (anti-government
demonstrations), and government crackdowns on political opposition (purges). In other words, these findings
suggest that dissenters use new ICTs to gather support and momentum in organizing protests, and governments are
not shy about suppressing dissident activities, likely with the assistance of new ICTs. This was the case in all
countries and in non-democratic countries. While these findings require further exploration, they are important first
steps towards empirical support for these relationships.
While new ICTs in countries present potential opportunities for circumventing government censorship, free
speech/free press research indicated that free flowing communication in a society contributed to societies engaging
in peaceful means of sociopolitical problem solving (Roy, 2014). I found consistent support that freedom of the
press ratings negatively related with sociopolitical instability. That is, in countries that protect and promote freedom
of speech, sociopolitical instability is less likely to occur.
The government reactions to the Occupy protests in the US and Europe demonstrated that physically
suppressing protest activities are not behaviors reserved solely for authoritarian regimes (Occupy, 2014). However,
there is much less known about media systems characteristics in the non-Western world. I found that in non-
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democratic countries, higher rates of Internet penetration rates predicted higher rates of sociopolitical instability,
while more press freedoms were negatively related to sociopolitical instability. In other words, in countries that have
little (to none) free speech protection but have access to the Internet, then sociopolitical instability was common.
This relationship held when looking only at non-democracies that experienced higher than average rates of
sociopolitical instability. The main takeaway is that new ICT penetration rates were related to sociopolitical
instability in non-democratic countries over the last two decades. These findings strengthen the case for the
proponents who argue for the aptitude of dissenters using new ICTs to organize despite the suppression efforts of
governments.
Nonviolent and Violent Conflict
In researching sociopolitical instability, I found evidence that higher rates of new ICTs in a country related
to higher rates of sociopolitical instability. The types of sociopolitical instability were both violent (guerrilla
warfare, riots, purges) and nonviolent (anti-government demonstrations, strikes). There are reasons to research
nonviolent and violent conflict separately, including evidence that nonviolent conflict is quicker, more successful,
and more likely to result in a democratic form of government in the countries that they occur (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013).
I found strong evidence that indicated that higher rates of traditional media, new ICTs, and press freedoms
predicted nonviolent conflict compared to violent conflict. The findings here make theoretical sense, but had not
been demonstrated at the aggregate-level. Before this study, the only correlates of major nonviolent conflicts were
higher population, flat terrain, and stronger authoritarian governments (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013).
Socially conscious and politically active individuals can use new ICTs to communicate, amplify grievances, civil
rights desires, and organize collective action with speed and efficiency. Due to the collective action enhancing
capabilities that new ICTs provide, it is logical that when comparing nonviolent and violent conflict, that higher
levels of new ICTs were beneficial to nonviolent conflict. The findings regarding the traditional media and the
freedom of the press indicators are equally substantial. The more information outlets in a country, the more that
society will come to rely on those information outlets, especially in times of sociopolitical instability (DeFleur &
Rokeach, 1989). In countries that have developed and free flowing communication/media environments, the more
likely popular grievances and protests can be aired and shared, and the more likely a major conflict will be
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nonviolent rather than violent. These findings support the notion that “… in a State where public discussion exists
and the media can deal freely with the problems of society, large-scale violence is not tolerated,” (Gusevea et al.,
2008, p. 97).
Democracy
Developed and free media and new ICT systems predicted higher levels of democracy. In most of the
models, the media/ICT variable coefficients positively related with increased levels of institutionalized democracy
in all countries and in countries that are not full-democracies. Press freedoms as predictors of higher levels of
institutionalized democracies were widely supported. Additionally, I found evidence that strongly suggested that in
countries that experienced sociopolitical instability, the diffusion of new ICTs/media and increased press freedoms
related to increased levels of institutionalized democracy, supporting a key proposition of media systems
dependency theory.
In non-democratic countries, the Internet variable coefficient correlated with lower levels of democracy.
This prevented the full support for the hypothesis but presents an interesting finding, nevertheless. Non-democratic
countries such as China and Saudi Arabia have well developed and widely used Internet infrastructure. This should
not, however, be interpreted as detrimental to the arguments and evidence that new ICTs are democratizing agents.
Perhaps, a more likely and appropriate interpretation is that the first part of the dictators’ dilemma, that new ICT
adoption is too economically important to ignore, has come to fruition. While the next phase, that “…economic
efficiency and political efficacy are positively related to each other, and negatively related to authoritarian control”
(Kenzie & Aragon,2002, p. 109), is in progress. By and large, however, new ICTs, cell phones in particular, and
press freedoms were reliable predictors of higher levels of democracy in countries that are not full democracies.
Developed and free communication environments are not only necessary in mature democratic systems but are
corner stones for transitional states attempting to break away from authoritarian control. Freer and more developed
media systems can assist with ushering in democratic reforms by performing watchdog functions, which keep the
public informed and could help prevent authoritarian relapses. Government legislation solidifying press and Internet
freedoms are key to sustained democratic transitions (Voltmer & Rownsley, 2009). This dynamic can be perceived
as a co-evolution between emerging democratic institutions while the press steadily liberalizes with assurances from
the government.
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Overall Implications
In this study, I found support for several political communication theories and propositions. In researching
sociopolitical instability and conflict, one is ultimately researching stability and peace. Economic stability and
growth are interdependent with sociopolitical stability and peace, each benefiting the other. Free and developed
media systems support economic productivity and long-term sociopolitical stability (Weaver et al., 1985).
Democracy contributes to long-term peace and economic growth, and developed and free media systems contribute
to democracy. In other words, the road to lasting peace seems best paved by way of societal freedoms.
I am not intending to over simplify the complex dynamics that occur in societies by arguing that freedom of
speech and new ICTs lead to instantaneous democracy, which equates to long-lasting prosperity. Nevertheless, I
found strong evidence for new ICTs as democratizing instruments. Not all episodes of sociopolitical instability are
democratizing acts, but often times they are. In the event of a large-scale societal uprising, nonviolent resistance is
preferable to civil war. I found that new ICTs and traditional media indicators highly related to regime-challenging
nonviolent conflict, which is quicker, more effective, and more likely to lead to democracy than violent conflict.
Nor am I intending to advocate for the imposition of western-style democracy on non-democratic countries.
Societies should be allotted the autonomy to pick their own forms of governance. Freedom of speech and expression
go a long way in helping societies deliberate about their futures. Freedom of expression could be pegged as a
western value, but it is a value supported by evidence of long-term societal benefits and should be uncontroversial at
this point. I found evidence that suggests that press and Internet freedoms negatively related to sociopolitical
instability, positively related to democracy, and related to nonviolent compared to violent conflict. These findings
support the propositions of the theory of freedom of expression.
Indeed, strong authoritarian governments can maintain stability by way of economic growth and
suppression, which includes control of the media and information systems. Breaking free from authoritarian control
is a long and messy process. Nevertheless, drawing on previous research and the evidence produced here, stability
by way of liberation as opposed to continued suppression is key to long-term peace and prosperity. And free and
developed media systems are key components in the process to prosperous and peaceful societies.
This research is relevant to political communication and political science researchers, democracy and civil rights
advocates, and policy makers. Supporting authoritarian governments that control the media and new ICT systems in
a country may appeal to some people who opt for short-term stability over freedom of speech and democratic rights.
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However, by taking the long-view, one sees the potential upsides of supporting episodes of democratizing instability
if the outcome is longer-lasting peace and development. These societal conflicts are constantly and increasingly
occurring.
Limitations and Future Research
As is the case with aggregate-level research, this study has limitation in the magnitude and certainty of the
conclusions about the relationships demonstrated here. Among the biggest limitations is the inability to directly
connect the individual instances of sociopolitical instability and/or nonviolent conflict with protest participants that
used new ICTs to acquire/produce information that assisted with dissident efforts. That is, I cannot say with
certainty that each protest campaign had a digital presence and used new ICTs to further their causes. These
assumptions were drawn from the aggregate correlations and past research that indicated that individuals use these
technologies when motivated to do so for dissident purposes. Another limitation of cross-national data is that
sociopolitical instability and protests may take place at the city/town level, presenting the possibility that the citylevel media/ICT rates are different than the national rates. Finally, many of the models, particularly the models that
analyzed the different types of sociopolitical instability, had low r-square coefficients and statistically insignificant
control variables. This indicates that some of the models were not great fits and could benefit from different control
variables.
To help address these limitations, future research is needed at all different levels, from aggregate-level to
individual case studies. I will continue to add to these data used here and attempt to drill down to the regional and
city levels. As stated in the limitation, I think there is much to learn about the types of sociopolitical instability and
how the various types impact governance in those countries. We would do well to attempt to understand how new
ICTs are contributing to democratic socialization in transitional governments and if they are contributing to
increased freedoms of expression. This could be accomplished, in part, thru gathering and analyzing data regarding
global media and new ICT usage habits in relation to free speech and democratic attitudes, cross-sectional and
overtime. Research into the digital characteristics of successful/unsuccessful protest campaigns could provide
valuable insight. Are there correlates of successful online campaigns? Are there tipping points for the number of
participants required for a successful campaign? What types of issues are motivating the masses? Additionally, the
propositions of the dictator’s dilemma could be examined more closely, through case studies and regional
quantitative data, as they are potentially occurring in countries such as China and in the Middle East and North
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Africa. These are all important factors, and scholars as well as the public should continue to learn about these
phenomena. As the world continues to become increasingly interconnected and individuals continue to agitate for
individual rights, popular protests and dissident activities of all types will likely continually increase in the future.
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